Governance in slow motion: The human cost of delayed action

By John Laisani | Mar 19, 2026 | 5 Min read

ZIMBABWE’S informal settlements are not a surprise.

They are a pattern and a predictable one.

What is surprising is how the State continues to respond to them.

Across urban areas, settlements emerge, expand and stabilise over years without decisive intervention.

Then, at a point where communities are fully established, enforcement arrives abruptly.

This is presented as the application of the law. In reality, it is the consequence of governance that has failed to act when it should have.

This is where the debate needs to shift.

The issue is not simply that people are settling on land without authorisation.

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The issue is that the State has allowed these situations to evolve into complex, entrenched realities before responding.

By the time enforcement takes place, the problem is no longer administrative, it is social, economic and humanitarian.

A system that intervenes late will always produce disruptive outcomes.

There is a structural flaw at the centre of this pattern.

Urban governance in Zimbabwe is not operating as a continuous system. It is episodic.

Monitoring is weak, early intervention is inconsistent and enforcement is delayed.

This creates a cycle in which informal occupation is effectively unmanaged in its early stages, only to be forcefully addressed once it becomes difficult to resolve.

The consequences are predictable. Households invest in housing because there is no immediate deterrent.

Communities form because there is no early disruption.

Informal economies emerge because there is no structured alternative.

By the time the Sate acts, it is no longer dealing with land occupation; it is dismantling functioning communities.

At that point, enforcement becomes costly not just financially, but socially and politically.

What is often missing from policy discussions is the question of timing.

Governance is not only about what is done, but when it is done.

Early intervention is inexpensive, targeted and manageable.

Late intervention is disruptive, contested and difficult to justify.

Zimbabwe’s current approach consistently defaults to the latter.

This is not simply a technical failure. It is an institutional one.

Responsibilities for land management are spread across multiple authorities, with limited co-ordination and unclear accountability.

When no single institution is compelled to act at a specific point, inaction becomes the default.

Decisions are deferred and the system effectively waits until the problem escalates.

At the same time, the State’s conduct is not always neutral.

Where authorities have tolerated settlements over long periods, or engaged with them in various ways, they influence behaviour.

People respond to what the system does, not only what it says.

When enforcement eventually occurs, it appears inconsistent not because the law has changed, but because its application has been delayed.

If this cycle is to be broken, the response must move beyond general calls for better planning.

What is required is a governance model that is enforceable, time-bound and institutionally coherent.

The starting point is to make inaction impossible.

Monitoring of land use must trigger mandatory responses.

If a new settlement is detected, there should be a legally defined window within which authorities must act.

Failure to do so should not disappear into administrative silence, it should carry consequences for the responsible institutions.

Without this, delays will continue to be absorbed as part of the system.

Intervention must also be structured, not discretionary.

A settlement that is a few weeks old cannot be treated in the same way as one that has existed for a decade.

Early-stage occupation requires immediate containment.

Established settlements require managed solutions.

This distinction should not depend on political judgement; it should be embedded in policy and law.

Institutional coordination is equally critical.

Monitoring, planning and enforcement must operate as a single system, not as disconnected functions.

A unified urban land management structure, with clear authority and shared data, reduces the delays caused by fragmented decision-making.

Without co-ordination, even well-designed policies fail in practice.

There is also a need to introduce accountability into enforcement itself.

Where settlements have existed for extended periods, eviction should not be treated as a routine administrative action.

It should require justified evidence that alternatives have been considered that impacts have been assessed and that the response is proportionate.

This is not about weakening enforcement; it is about strengthening its legitimacy.

Finally, any governance model that does not address supply will remain incomplete.

As long as access to serviced land remains limited and slow, informal settlement will continue to fill the gap.

Expanding the availability of affordable, serviced land is not a parallel issue, it is central to resolving the problem.

What emerges from this is a simple but often overlooked point: informal settlements are not only a product of demand pressures; they are also a product of governance delays.

As long as the State continues to arrive late after settlements have formed, after investments have been made, after communities have stabilised, the outcomes will remain the same.

Enforcement will be disruptive, contested and insufficient.

The real question is not whether the State has the authority to act.

It is whether it can act at the right time, in the right way and through the right institutions.

For the Local Government and Public Works ministry, this is more than an administrative challenge; it is a test of institutional credibility.

The moment calls for decisive reform that restores predictability, enforces accountability and aligns authority with timely action.

If intervention continues to come only after crises have matured, the cycle will persist.

If, however, governance begins to act when signals first appear firmly, consistently and transparently, then the State will not only manage urban growth more effectively, it will rebuild public confidence in its ability to do so.

The choice is no longer about whether to act, but whether to act early enough to make a difference.