THE United States (US) made the global war on terror a near universal State practice after 9/11.
It also sold strategic ambiguity across the world based on its relations with Taiwan.
Strategic ambiguity has now turned into strategic intelligence.
Even senior military commanders, policy-makers or regional defence leaders who focus on form and not operational importance of article 2(4) of the UN Charter risk doing so at their own peril.
This article explains the tension between formal or legalistic compliance with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and operational efficacy in modern hybrid and surgical warfare, with historical, legal and theoretical context.
My former student asked me whether international law is not real law following the US operational and strategic intelligence in Venezuela.
I advised him to avoid academic arguments that ignore tactical, operational and strategic significance in wars that invoke the zero visibility principle.
Beyond Article 2(4) form
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Today, I want to challenge the way we read Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
Too often, puritan legal analysis focuses on the form of this legal provision, that is, visible invasion, declarations of war or territorial occupation.
But in modern warfare, State sovereignty or rather, the classical triangle of sovereignty is contested not just by force, but by how we shape attention, decision-making and legitimacy.
This new triangle of territorial integrity, decision autonomy and legitimacy is a distinction military commanders the world over must internalise.
Assessing Form vs Operational Efficacy
As alluded to above, legal form focuses on observable acts like capturing a sovereign leader, absence of a legal declaration of war and formal violations of the UN Charter provisions like article 2(4), 39 or 51.
In contradistinction, operational efficacy looks beyond the obvious form of the UN Charter and considers the sovereignty effects that are achieved through zero-visibility operations, precision intelligence and strategic ambiguity.
The US achieved the zero visibility principle by diverting the Venezuelan military’s attention from the presidency to the airbases that were attacked simultaneously with other targets.
Key point lessons for State sovereignty
The US used strategic intelligence that utilised hybrid warfare, naval supremacy enmeshed in Mahan’s notion of territorial dominance and Sun Tzu’s warning on taking the enemy by surprise.
In this way, naval blockade was used to neutralise the Venezuelan military’s attention.
Airspace dominance by Delta Force and support from the Night Stalkers created a situation where State borders may remain intact while authority and decision autonomy are subtly constrained by a rival.
The greatest lesson from that is that operational military effect is the currency of sovereignty today, not the form of compliance with legal instruments at national or international levels.
Comparing Article 2(4), other UN Charter provisions & US context
Article 51: Self-defence, reactive and proportional.
Internationally, Chapter VII/Article 39 of the UN Charter speaks to collective enforcement of decisions, but is avoided by States because it is slower than unilateral calibrated operations.
Domestically, in the US Context, the President can deploy forces operationally while the US Congress declares war formally.
In this way, strategic ambiguity which has long been the US’ policy allows hyperpowers to act operationally without breaking the law on paper.
Some historical analogies
Era/actor principle relevance
Students of legal history know that Babylon used the Suzerainty and vassal compliance mechanism.
The law in form was there but real control was via perception and obedience to the vassal agreement.
This was even noticeable closer to Zimbabwe in the vassal agreements in the Mutapa, Rozvi and Ndebele empires.
Assyria used targeted campaigns to force cognitive domination and avoid random occupation of weaker States.
Even for Africa, leaders like Shaka the Zulu used the cow horn formation to show the importance of speed and operational cohesion while catching the enemy by surprise and not formal war declaration.
For the US, the blockade of the Venezuelan naval space several weeks before the most talked about real act fits into naval strategist.
Mahan’s Maritime command philosophy that emphasised strategic positioning rather than visible conventional battles.
The lesson in all these historical records shows how operational effect has historically trumped formal legalism whether one looks at domestic or international law.
Strategic intelligence, Copenhagen School and Speech Acts
The Venezuelan example shows how state security is now constructed through authoritative speech acts as steeped in the Copenhagen School of Intelligence.
Law is never the outcome because law always operates together with security intelligence and command decisions in a performative way.
For starters, the three aspects authorise, prioritise and legitimise covert and blitzkrieg-like operations.
Current State practice on terrorism
9/11 allowed the US as a superpower to create agreed state practice that real or perceived acts of terrorism will be operationally stamped out.
Modern hyperpowers like the US exploit counterterrorism and anti-narcotics frameworks as legal and narrative speech acts, shaping perception and legitimising surgical operations such as the one in Venezuela.
Using the Copenhagen School approach, when speech acts such as the global war on terror define legitimacy, perception that a president may be engaged in feeder acts dominates the formal argument on the use of force.
What about surgical operations in the Supersonic Era?
The surgical operation by the US shows precision, speed, intelligence-led, low-visibility operations.
Its use of diversionary tactics focusing on attacking the military base led to sovereignty erosion in Venezuela’s decision cycles, not necessarily territory.
The Venezuelan military prioritised the need to protect its military base and left the real target, that is, the presidency, exposed.
Legal analysis at international law
From the foregoing, the international legal frameworks such Article 2(4), 51 and UN Security Council resolutions remain respected in form while operational efficacy is maximised in application.
The Triangle of Sovereignty is also recalibrated because territorial integrity is respected by the zero visibility principle, where traditional borders and assets are strategically used to lure the target military objects away from the real military target.
The decision autonomy of the US becomes clear in its superior ability to prioritise, respond and control tempo of the attack on the real target.
The pillar of legitimacy includes how the US President used his domestic operational powers to circumvent UA Congress and launch an internationalised operation.
Modern warfare targets the cognitive and institutional pillars of the remodelled sovereignty triangle, often leaving the visible form of Article 2(4) intact.
Intelligence vs warped expert analysis
States need to avoid warped expert analysis that focuses on the form of international law.
This is because military and security intelligence frame threats in tactical, operational and strategic ways; law authorises escalation; and military command acts within strategic ambiguity or intelligence.
International lawyers who ignore or are ignorant of strategic policies risk falling into the form of law trap.
On another hand, military rulers who exclude strategically-informed lawyers usually misinterpret Article 2(4) of the UN Charter by placing reliance on warped “expert” analysis which may lead to poor decision-making.
Exclusive focus must be placed on how hyperpowers leverage on legal form to justify operational effect.
Africa learnt this late when it imposed a fly zone in Libya many years ago only to mourn when it learnt the hard way when Tripoli fell and threw Libya into kinetic chaos.
Africa, Sadc and other regions must understand the concept of strategic intelligence with alacrity to avoid strategic misalignment.
Some lessons for Africa, Sadc and global militaries
States must understand how responses like global war on terror have evolved into some usus and psychology of statecraft.
They need to invest in legal-intelligence integration at senior military command levels.
This helps them to prioritise decision autonomy over mere border or military fortification.
One sure way is to avoid classical State actor emphasis espoused by thinkers like Barry Buzan and begin to understand the power of speech acts such as evolving perceptions like global war on terror and how this perception can determine conflict outcomes in linked transnational crimes like drug or human trafficking.
The Middle East, Russia-Ukraine war and other conflicts have shown us that surgical and hybrid operations are now standard; and sovereignty protection depends on tempo, cognition and legitimacy.
Strategic ambiguity and global norms
Before I sign off, perhaps a caveat is needed on strategic ambiguity.
The Global War on Terror and anti-narcotics frameworks are now accepted by nearly all States, including UN Security Council members.
Hyperpowers such as the US exploit such ambiguity under these frameworks to achieve objectives without formal war.
The US has for instance classified the Venezuelan attack as part of operational planning and such planning must account for form vs effect, not just compliance or visible deterrence.
Conclusion
In the age of hybrid and surgical warfare, State sovereignty is challenged not by who moves first, but by who controls perception or the mind of States, decision tempo and legitimacy.
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is alive when it guides calibration, but operational effect defines outcomes such as what happened in Venezuela.
Military forces that integrate law, intelligence and strategy will preserve sovereignty; those that do not will be out-paced even while ostensibly compliant with international law.
We live in an era of transdisciplinary strategic intelligence which must be legally disciplined, command-focused and safe for strategic briefing even from psychological or sociological standpoints.
