Standing on a podium at the Syama Prasad Mookerjee Port in Kolkata, Narendra Modi was bursting with pride.
In the water below the prime minister of India were three additions to its navy: INS Dunagiri, a stealth frigate armed with guided missiles; INS Agray, an anti-submarine vessel, and INS Sanshodhak, a survey ship.
To rapturous applause, Mr Modi said: “These were made in India and designed in India. The skill and hard work of Indian engineers lie behind them. This is the greatest strength of New India.”
Together, the three newly commissioned vessels reveal how his country is preparing to defend an increasingly contested Indian Ocean, as China expands its military presence in waters New Delhi has long regarded as its backyard.
China is building and financing a network of commercial ports and naval infrastructure, often known as the String of Pearls. These dual-use facilities can serve both civilian shipping and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) naval vessels.
With three new ships designed to monitor, deter and, if necessary, confront Chinese naval activity, it is, as Mr Modi said, “a milestone for India’s maritime security”.
China’s PLA navy is now the world’s largest by vessel numbers. It has steadily increased its footprint in the Indian Ocean through submarine deployments, intelligence-gathering missions and investments in ports stretching from Gwadar in Pakistan to Djibouti in East Africa.
Gwadar gives China overland access to the Arabian Sea. Kyaukphyu Port in Myanmar allows China to bypass the contested Strait of Malacca, giving direct access to the Bay of Bengal. Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka was leased to a Chinese firm for 99 years.
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It is a logistical waypoint, just off the Indian coast. China’s first overseas military base, in Djibouti, sits on the Horn of Africa. The western Indian Ocean can be monitored from there.
Narendra Modi, the Indian prime minister, launched the ships at the Syama Prasad Mookerjee Port in Kolkata on Monday
Narendra Modi, the Indian prime minister, unveiled the ships at the Syama Prasad Mookerjee Port in Kolkata on Monday
For India, the challenge extends far beyond Chinese surface warships in the ocean through which 95 per cent of its trade moves.
Harsh Pant is vice-president at New Delhi-based think tank Observer Research Foundation and professor of international relations at King’s College London.
He said: “The commissioning of these vessels underscores that India sees China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean not only as a maritime challenge but as a multidimensional challenge. These three vessels strengthen three different layers of naval power.”
Prof Pant said the ships reflected India’s assessment that future competition in the Indian Ocean would depend on maintaining a visible naval presence; tracking and countering submarines, and developing superior knowledge of the underwater battlespace.
He added: “India is preparing not just for conventional naval competition on the surface, but a prolonged contest over sea control, undersea dominance and maritime intelligence across the Indian Ocean.”
These are the three new warships and how they are designed to respond to China:
This is the most powerful of the three vessels – a 6,500-ton stealth frigate armed with BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles and advanced air-defence systems.
Built under Project 17A, India’s flagship warship programme, the vessel can escort carrier groups, protect sea lanes and engage threats in the air, on the surface and below the waterline.
The stealth frigate reflects India’s desire to maintain a credible presence across the wider Indian Ocean, where Chinese naval deployments have become increasingly frequent.
The vessel’s stealth features make it more difficult to detect, while its missile systems allow it to strike targets at long range.
Such capabilities are becoming increasingly important as India seeks to monitor key sea lanes through which much of China’s trade and energy imports pass. Indian planners recognise they cannot compete with China by matching its fleet vessel for vessel.
Mr Pant said: “There is no denying the fact that China has a numerical advantage. But India has a geographic advantage.” He argued that New Delhi’s strategy was becoming increasingly asymmetric and geographically focused.
Rather than attempting to dominate distant oceans, India was concentrating on protecting its own sea lines of communication, monitoring Chinese naval movements and strengthening its position near critical maritime chokepoints.
While INS Dunagiri projects power above the surface, INS Agray addresses what many Indian officials increasingly view as the most serious long-term challenge in the region: Chinese submarines.
The vessel belongs to the Arnala class of anti-submarine-warfare ships and is designed to detect and engage underwater threats operating in coastal and shallow waters.
Equipped with advanced sonar systems, lightweight torpedoes and anti-submarine rocket launchers, it strengthens India’s ability to protect ports, naval bases and coastal approaches.
Chinese submarines regularly operate in the Indian Ocean, officially conducting anti-piracy missions, but also gathering valuable intelligence on regional waters and naval activity.
Kamlesh Kumar Agnihotri, a senior fellow at the National Maritime Foundation in New Delhi, said: “The Chinese submarines are going far and wide beyond their coastline, and they have also been making forays into the Indian Ocean.
“The main USP of submarines is their stealth, so it is very important to detect the presence of foreign submarines in Indian waters.”
Prof Pant agreed: “Anti-submarine warfare is becoming one of the highest-priority missions for the Indian navy. Chinese submarine deployments in the Indian Ocean have become more frequent, more sophisticated and more sustained.
India has also responded by investing in maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, surveillance networks and underwater detection systems.
Prof Pant added: “The trend suggests that future competition between India and China in the Indian Ocean will be as much about who can find whom underwater as about the number of warships each side possesses.”
The third vessel lacks the firepower of a frigate or submarine-hunter, but strategists regard it as equally significant. INS Sanshodhak conducts hydrographic and oceanographic surveys; maps the seabed, and collects underwater data using autonomous and remotely operated systems.
Such information is essential for submarine operations, navigation, anti-submarine warfare and the protection of undersea infrastructure, including communication cables that carry vast quantities of global internet traffic.
Seabed mapping has become increasingly important as navies compete beneath the surface.
The tropical waters of the Indian Ocean often favour submarines, because changing temperature, salinity and density layers can help them evade detection, making detailed knowledge of the underwater environment a strategic advantage.
Mr Modi, speaking at the commissioning ceremony, said: “Today, India is no longer just a buyer; it is manufacturing and selling modern weapons to many countries and also building indigenous strength.”
He did not mention China by name, but his intentions were clear, as he added: “India wants to become a producer. The day we become a producer, we will also become a decision-maker.”
India is also deepening security cooperation with countries that share concerns about China’s growing influence, expanding naval cooperation with the UK, the US, Japan, Australia and several other European countries.
It has participated in exercises and information-sharing arrangements designed to improve maritime awareness across the Indo-Pacific.
He said: “The competition is less about fleet size and more about access to ports and logistics networks, surveillance and intelligence, submarine operations, control of maritime choke points, strategic partnerships and influence over regional states.”
Some observers have been looking back to a statement Mr Modi made in 2020, after deadly clashes between India and China along the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh.
He said: “The age of expansionism is over; this is the age of development. History is witness that expansionist forces have either lost or were forced to turn back.”
Today, the age of expansionism is not over. It is the age of development. And the history of what happens next in the Indian Ocean has not yet been written.
