The Finance minister’s failure to stop pension rights abuse by insurance companies, by Insurance and Pension Commission (IPEC) and by his ministry, has to date shown up as poor performance in his job.
Martin Tarusenga
This suggests that he may not have been appointed on merit, or the President failed to identify this ineptitude on appointing him.
On the other hand, the President’s apparent indifference firstly to the minister’s poor performance, and secondly to the serious plight of pensioners whose rights are being abused, has shown up apparent self-interest in governing Zimbabwe — not governing in public interest.
Apart from this apparent condoning of poor performance by his minister, conclusions that the President is not governing in the public interest, have also been premised on observations that he does “. . . not seem committed to get rid of the widespread corruption in his Government, as exposed by the SalaryGate scandals, and observations that successive Zimbabwe Governments since independence have avoided, indeed resisted, the use of transparent professionally executed public inquiries to resolve national crises such as this pension benefit stand-off, where members of the public cry to government for the truth (and justice thereof).”
Considering that the President cannot be indicted, and can so condone his minister thereby maintaining the abusive status quo, there is a case for pensioners and other of the members of the public to urgently lobby the Parliament of Zimbabwe, herein the Legislature, for a review of current pension, insurance and social security legislation, and curb pension rights abuse.
Section 131 of Zimbabwe’s Constitution read together with the Fifth Schedule, makes provision on how proposals for change in Acts of Parliament, and Bills thereof, can be introduced into Parliament.
Do the pensioners have a chance for relief when it is considered that this Constitution, one way or the other, provides that unfettered, but undemocratic authority to the President in the appointment of all key positions in Government and private sector?
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For starters, Section 116 of Chapter 6 of Zimbabwe’s Constitution, Part I, for instance, provides that the President is intrinsically a part of Parliament, the Legislature, specifying that “The Legislature of Zimbabwe consists of Parliament and the President acting in accordance with this Chapter.”
If the President is averse to removing the loopholes in the current pension and insurance legislation, in scenarios when he, personally benefits by maintaining his errant Finance minister, he can use his power as President, and his dual undemocratic role in both the Executive and the Legislature to prevail, undemocratically, on the Legislature, and maintain the loopholes in current pension and insurance legislation, that are the cause of agony to pensioners.
The Legislature is therefore not independent of the President, and therefore of the Executive, and this lobby might not be succesful.
But supposing the Legislature, herein Parliament, has a measure of independence from the President and the Executive, and stands firm against the President’s decision to maintain the loopholes, and hence to maintain his minister. In the these circumstances it is incumbent upon the President, in terms of Section 131, to refer any such disagreements between him and the Legislature over proposed changes in Acts of Parliament (Bills), to a Constitutional Court.
If this is done, the President can, and will still prevail on the Legislature, as he can still put pressure on members of the Constitutional Court to rule in his favour, as these members are appointed more or less unilaterally by the President.
The Constitutional Court consists of (a) the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice; and (b) five other judges of the Constitutional Court (Section 166); where in accordance with Section 180 “(1) The Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice, the Judge President of the High Court and all other judges are appointed by the President.
Members of the Constitutional Court must therefore, rationally, be beholden to the President, for being in this job. It is exactly the same as all employees would be beholden to their employers.
The members of the Constitutional Court are to all intents and purposes, therefore not neutral; the President can apply that manipulative pressure, indeed threaten, bulldoze the Constitutional Court to rule in his favour.
The loopholes in current pension and insurance legislation, allowing the abuse of pension rights by insurance companies, IPEC and by the Finance Ministry would in this event, be maintained, if indeed the President benefits one way or the other from the abusive state of affairs in the pension, insurance and social security services.
More important, however, this provision by the Constitution of Zimbabwe for the President to appoint members of the Constitutional Court is firstly in breach of established rational principles and practices of good corporate governance, requiring such a Court to be neutral. Secondly it is blatant flagrant breach of the Founding Provisions of the Constitution of Zimbabwe as laid out in Chapter 1, item 1(h) and item 2, and in breach of the National Objectives on good governance as laid out in Chapter 2, main item 9, sub item 1 and 2.
In effect the abuse of pensioner rights are apparently serious breaches of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, that need an urgent constitutional review.
Martin Tarusenga is General Manager of Zimbabwe Pensions & Insurance Rights, email, [email protected]; telephone; +263 (0)4 883057; Mobile; +263 (0)772 889 716
Opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not represent those of the organisations that the author represent.
