THE Indus River System comprises six major rivers — the Indus, Chenab, Jhelum, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej — flowing through the territories of both India and Pakistan. The system sustains drinking water, agriculture, and electricity generation across the Indus Basin, supporting hundreds of millions of people on both sides of the border.
When British India was partitioned in 1947, the Indus River System was also divided between the two successor states. The geographic reality was stark: India, as the upper riparian state, controlled the headwaters of most rivers, while Pakistan’s agricultural heartland—the heavily irrigated Punjab plains—depended critically on continued water flows from the east.
India, for its part, required access to the system for development in Punjab and Rajasthan, while also seeking stability and normalised relations with its new western neighbour. Despite its domestic needs, India concluded a highly concessionary water-sharing pact with Pakistan on 19 September 1960, facilitated by the World Bank.
From the outset, negotiations were shaped by an asymmetry between India’s cooperative approach and Pakistan’s maximalist demands — an imbalance that significantly influenced outcomes in Pakistan’s favour.
The World Bank’s first substantive proposal of February 5, 1954 already reflected this imbalance. It required significant concessions from India, including:
lAbandonment of planned Indian developments on the upper Indus and Chenab, with benefits accruing to Pakistan
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lForfeiture of approximately 6 MAF of Chenab waters
lNo availability of Chenab waters at Marala for Indian use
lNo water development in Kutch from the river system
Despite these conditions, India accepted the proposal in good faith, signalling its willingness for a swift resolution. Pakistan, by contrast, delayed formal acceptance until December 1958. This asymmetry meant India accepted binding restrictions while Pakistan continued developing new uses on the Western rivers without equivalent constraints—reinforcing a pattern that cooperation was costly and obstruction rewarding.
Under the Treaty, India received exclusive rights to the Eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi), while Pakistan received the Western rivers (Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum). India was permitted limited non-consumptive use of the Western rivers, primarily run-of-river hydropower generation, subject to strict design constraints.
In volumetric terms, the Eastern rivers allocated to India carry approximately 33 million acre-feet (MAF) annually, while the Western rivers allocated to Pakistan carry about 135 MAF — roughly 80% of the system’s flow. India received about 20%, effectively formalising access it already had while relinquishing claims to the larger Western system.
A notable feature of the Treaty is its financial provision: India agreed to pay approximately £62 million (about US$2,5 billion in present value) to Pakistan for water infrastructure development in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. This remains a rare case in which an upstream state surrendered the majority of a river system while also financing the downstream state.
The Treaty also imposes one-sided operational restrictions on India, including:
lLimits on irrigated cropped area
lStrict controls on storage capacity on Western rivers
lDetailed design restrictions on hydropower projects
These constraints apply only to India, effectively regulating its development while imposing no equivalent obligations on Pakistan.
Since its inception, Pakistan has frequently used the Treaty’s dispute resolution mechanisms to delay or obstruct Indian projects. Hydropower projects such as Baglihar, Kishenganga, Pakal Dul, and Tulbul have faced repeated objections and prolonged legal processes. Even where projects comply with Treaty provisions, they have been challenged, suggesting objections are often strategic rather than technical.
Pakistan has simultaneously promoted a narrative of India as a potential “water aggressor,” despite India’s consistent compliance with the Treaty for over 65 years, including during periods of armed conflict in 1965, 1971, and 1999.
The Treaty’s constraints have had significant developmental consequences for India. Large areas of Rajasthan and Punjab remain under-irrigated, while Jammu and Kashmir’s hydropower potential remains largely underutilised due to design restrictions and procedural delays.
The Treaty was intended to ensure “the most complete and satisfactory utilisation of the waters of the Indus system in a spirit of goodwill and friendship.” However, that geopolitical context has significantly changed.
Pakistan’s continued use of cross-border terrorism against India — through incidents including the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the April 2025 Pahalgam attack — raises fundamental questions about the premise of good faith underlying treaty compliance. International agreements rely not only on legal text but on mutual trust and reciprocal conduct.
In this context, India’s continued unilateral compliance, despite sustained asymmetry and security challenges, reflects a structural imbalance in the Treaty’s implementation.
The Indus Waters Treaty has often been described as a diplomatic success. However, its history reveals a more complex reality: one in which India accepted significant concessions, financial costs, and long-term developmental constraints, while Pakistan gained the bulk of the system’s waters and a platform to challenge Indian projects internationally.
India has remained compliant for over six decades, even through wars and sustained cross-border hostilities. Yet it has also faced strategic obstruction, narrative warfare, and developmental limitations arising from the Treaty’s asymmetry.
India’s position today reflects an assertion that international agreements must operate as reciprocal frameworks, not one-sided obligations. Treaties derive legitimacy not only from their signing but from good-faith adherence by all parties.
To those questioning the timing of reassessment, it may be noted that there is no wrong time for a right decision.
*Pradeep Kumar Saxena, former Indian Commissioner for Indus Waters