CONSTITUTIONAL Amendment No 3 Bill appears to have provoked much more than its authors bargained for.
The opposition, as expected, reacted virulently.
What was unexpected was the open defiance of top Zanu PF apparatchiks fronted by retired Air Marshal Henry Muchena.
They spoke forcefully against the proposed amendment.
Noteworthy is that their letter touched on two points needing careful analysis.
One was the pointed reminder of the November 2017 coup that toppled long-time dictator, Robert Mugabe and replaced him with President Emmerson Mnangagwa.
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The second was a reminder by the ex-military signatories that they had sworn an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution of Zimbabwe.
The first point, the mention of the 2017 assisted transition, has deep resonance in Zimbabwe’s immediate history.
Firstly, it is a reminder to Mnangagwa of his origins: no matter how exalted he seems today, in early November 2017, he was nearly relegated to a footnote in Zimbabwean politics.
What saved him was not the hangers-on, bootlickers and fly-by-night millionaires that now surround him, but the men and women who appended their signatures on the said document.
It is a reminder of where the true power lies.
It is a warning on the ephemerality and deceptiveness of power.
The authors are warning Mnangagwa and the Vision 2030 cabal that they made him, that they are the power behind the throne and that they have always been.
The ball, so to speak, is in Mnangagwa’s court kufuga kana kuwarira.
Mention of the coup is also a direct threat to the establishment, as it has become.
It is a hoisting of the colours by the camp challenging the constitutional amendments.
Just before the events of November 2017, the Defence Forces, fronted by General Constantino Chiwenga (now Vice-President), came out and declared that they were the “stockholders” of the revolutionary party.
Again, this word has been used and bandied about.
It can be seen that the faction opposed to the extension of Mnangagwa’s term is sending out some not-so-subtle warnings.
The letter signals a clear stance: on this particular issue, they will fight.
Its second point of import was the reminder that the men and women in uniform, past and present, took an oath to defend the Constitution.
One must worry when high-ranking ex-military officials make it a point to remind the nation that they took an oath to defend the Constitution, not a party or person(s), on the eve of what are widely considered to be illegal changes to the said document.
Are we getting a preview of how the pretext for another military intervention might be framed: that it was merely an act to defend the Constitution?
This is frightening.
Zimbabwe could, therefore, be slipping into perhaps its most dangerous period since independence.
The reason why this could be so is that the 2017 coup was carried out against a despot whose sell-by date for the country, region and Zanu PF was past.
By November 2017, Mugabe was to all and sundry no more than an inconvenient anachronism.
The transition, therefore, was carried out smoothly and will be forever studied by military historians as the model of a politico-military coup.
Mugabe survived on assumptive power more than presumptive power.
This is because he had never been part of the military, intelligence or enforcement system.
He was wholly dependent on those who operated within these levers of power.
Mugabe did not have any organic power; he was made powerful by the loyalty of those he led.
He ruled at the pleasure of the military.
Therefore, despite the ostentation, Mugabe was a weak dictator as shown by his timid exiting of the Zimbabwean political scene with barely a shot fired.
Mnangagwa, on the other hand, presents a very different proposition altogether.
He has boasted openly that he is the architect and godfather of Zimbabwe’s vaunted security system.
Even going so far as to bragging that “ . . . no one can scheme against me”.
Mnangagwa, therefore, has a claim to being powerful that is more presumptive than assumptive.
He has operated within the security sector for much of his adult life.
This means that he has had the time and opportunity to mould a national security apparatus that is more personal than national.
He will not be an easy pushover.
Any attempt to “defend the Constitution” is likely going to go kinetic very quickly.
Both sides assume they are powerful: that is why the letter has been written and the push for the amendments has not ended.
Given the foregoing, this is the time for meaningful international mediation before Zimbabwe is plunged once again into avoidable fratricide and chaos.
It is obvious that Pretoria and the other Southern African Development Community capitals are getting very comprehensive intelligence briefings on the simmering tensions within Zanu PF and, thus, by extension, Zimbabwe.
This is the time to act, not when the tension has exploded into full-blown conflict.
After all, any conflict in Zimbabwe will undoubtedly have spillover effects on the other countries.
- Rigid Kondongwe is a political commentator. He writes here in his personal capcity.