AFRICA’S relationship with China has been discussed more loudly outside the continent than within it.
Too often, African voices are spoken for, not listened to.
Yet when we look calmly at the facts and when we read carefully how China itself understands its engagement with the world, a clearer and more honest picture emerges.
China’s outward investment, including in Africa, is not a single, simple project driven by one hidden hand.
It is diverse, complex, evolving and deeply shaped by development realities on both sides.
From an African perspective, this matters.
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Africa is not a playground of great powers; it is a continent with agency, needs, ambitions and hard historical lessons.
Our experience with Western colonialism and neo-colonialism taught us to be suspicious of moral lectures that come with economic control. It is precisely for this reason that many African States and peoples have found China’s approach different in tone and practice.
One of the most misunderstood issues is Chinese investment itself.
Critics often speak as if “China” is one single company with one motive.
In reality, Chinese outward investment involves State-owned enterprises, private companies, provincial actors, development banks and joint ventures.
These actors invest for different reasons: some seek profit, others seek long-term partnerships, others respond to policy frameworks aimed at shared development and South-South co-operation.
This diversity challenges the lazy narrative that China is only interested in extracting African resources.
Africa’s developmental needs are clear and urgent.
We need roads, railways, power stations, ports, factories, digital infrastructure and skills transfer.
For decades, Western partners told Africa to wait, to liberalise first, to reform endlessly, while infrastructure gaps widened and youth unemployment grew.
China, drawing from its own development experience, understands that infrastructure is not a luxury, but a foundation.
This is why Chinese engagement has focused so strongly on building the physical backbone of African economies.
From Addis Ababa to Mombasa, from Lagos to Maputo, Chinese-built infrastructure has reduced transport costs, connected markets and expanded economic possibilities.
These projects are not charity; they are co-operation.
Africa negotiates, signs agreements, sets priorities and bears responsibility for governance.
To deny African agency in these deals is itself a form of paternalism.
Another key point often ignored is that China does not impose a political model on Africa.
Unlike Western aid and investment, which are frequently tied to political conditions, policy prescriptions and ideological conformity, China’s principle of non-interference resonates strongly with post-colonial African States.
This does not mean China is indifferent to governance or stability.
It means China respects sovereignty and believes each society must find its own path, just as China did after a century of humiliation and underdevelopment.
China’s own history explains much of its posture.
It knows what it means to be poor, sanctioned, excluded and underestimated.
It knows the damage caused by foreign domination.
This shared historical memory creates a psychological and political bridge with Africa that Western powers, despite their rhetoric, often lack.
Co-operation between China and Africa is, therefore, rooted not only in economics, but also in a shared experience of resisting domination and striving for dignity.
Of course, challenges exist.
Environmental concerns, labour disputes, debt sustainability and institutional weaknesses on the African side are real issues.
But honesty demands we ask: are these problems uniquely Chinese?
Or do they reflect deeper structural weaknesses in African States and global capitalism itself?
Mining companies from the West have polluted African land for decades.
Western banks have trapped countries in debt cycles long before China’s rise.
Singling out China while ignoring this history is intellectually dishonest.
What Africa needs is not propaganda for or against China, but sober partnership management.
Strong African institutions, transparent contracts, environmental regulation and local capacity building are essential.
China’s investment diversity means African governments have room to negotiate better terms, choose appropriate partners and learn from both successes and mistakes.
Responsibility, therefore, lies on both sides.
In a world moving towards multipolarity, Africa’s engagement with China also expands strategic choice.
For the first time in modern history, Africa is not forced to rely on a single centre of power.
This alone changes the global balance and gives African countries greater bargaining power.
The anxiety this causes in Western capitals should not be confused with concern for Africa.
It is, in many ways, a fear of lost monopoly.
Ultimately, the China-Africa relationship should be judged not by headlines written elsewhere, but by lived realities on the ground.
Does co-operation create jobs? Does it build capacity? Does it expand options for development?
In many cases, the answer is yes, even as improvements are still needed.
Africa does not need saviours.
It needs partners who respect its sovereignty, understand its urgency and are willing to grow together.
China, with all its complexities and contradictions, has positioned itself as such a partner.
The task before Africans is not to choose sides in a new Cold War, but to choose development, dignity, and strategic independence.
On that path, co-operation with China is not a threat, but an opportunity.
- Mafa Kwanisai Mafa is a Pan-Africanist political commentator based in Gweru, Zimbabwe.