China, the Philippines, and the real lesson of second Thomas Shoal

If either transparency or diplomacy alone could secure a contested space, then the West Philippine Sea would have been calm and quiet decades ago. The uncomfortable truth is it has never been. Every Philippine administration since 1994 has confronted the same pattern: episodic crises, incremental expansionism, steadily intensifying coercion, and opportunistic negotiations. 

In fact, a more sober look at the historic pattern of Chinese action and Philippine government response shows that at no point has there been a genuine de-escalation of tension. The temporal pauses negotiated to de-escalate simply allowed China to consolidate gains and prepare for the next wave of escalatory engagement. 

Viewed from this analytical standpoint, the current public argument over the July 2024 Provisional Understanding on Second Thomas Shoal (known as Ayungin Shoal in the Philippines) rotation and reprovisioning (RORE) missions has become disappointingly narrow. Commentators have fixated on what the arrangement is – either a concession to China or another diplomatic measure to de-escalate tension – without asking the more important question: why did Beijing and Manila enter into that arrangement?

If we gloss over the events leading to the Provisional Understanding and judge it only by its immediate (and disputable) effects, we risk missing the strategic lesson of the Second Thomas Shoal standoff from 2022-2024. 

The Road to Crisis

Much of the public discourse treats the Provisional Understanding in static terms. One camp argues it risks legitimizing Chinese coercion and undermining the legal victory of the international arbitration ruling in 2016. Another side defends the understanding as a necessary mechanism to stabilize tensions and not a document that legally settles the dispute. Both sides appear to be evaluating the agreement prospectively, as if it emerged from nowhere. That misses the point.

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The events leading to the Provisional Understanding suggest that the deciding factor in the Philippines’ response to China’s coercion was neither assertive transparency nor sober diplomacy. Instead, it was national resolve – i.e., a state’s willingness to pursue its declared national interests or policy despite escalating costs and mounting pressure to back down.

For months leading up to June 17, 2024, Chinese maritime forces escalated pressure around Second Thomas Shoal. They started by using military-grade lasers, escalating to dangerous maneuvers, water cannoning, and ramming. Eventually, on June 17, 2024, Chinese coercion culminated in the violent boarding of a Philippine Navy boat that injured its personnel. Throughout this period, the Philippines practiced both assertive transparency and sober diplomacy.

The transparency campaign started as early as August 2023 during the first of what would become regular resupply missions to BRP Sierra Madre on Second Thomas Shoal. It was useful and helpful for attribution and to counter Chinese disinformation. It gave Western partners evidence to rally support as well as demonstrate the Philippines’ non-acquiescence to coercive demands. 

The campaign was widely praised. Its outputs helped policymakers and academics alike to study and address Chinese tactics and behavior. Its greatest value is sustaining international attention needed to shift the narrative environment in the Philippines’ favor and impose reputational cost on every act of coercion at sea.

But it did not stop escalation, nor did it deter China’s coercion. 

In a similar vein, sober diplomacy was tried during this period, beginning with the visit of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to China in January 2023. This visit affirmed the usefulness of the Philippines-China Bilateral Consultation Mechanism, or BCM, in managing issues in the West Philippine Sea. 

During the seventh BCM in Manila in March 2023, the two sides agreed to “exercise restraint,” make use of an existing hotline, improve maritime communication, and “properly handle emergencies at sea through friendly consultations.” In January 2024, at the eighth BCM held in Shanghai, both sides again agreed to improve maritime communication, properly manage disputes and emergencies, and avoid escalation around Second Thomas Shoal.

Yet, what followed these BCMs was not restraint or friendly engagements but escalating coercion.

In December 2023, for example, China water-cannoned and rammed Philippine vessels near Second Thomas Shoal, including a boat carrying Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff General Romeo Brawner. In March 2024, China Coast Guard ships again fired water cannon at Philippine resupply vessels, shattering a windshield and injuring at least four crew members. 

This sequence of events involving both assertive transparency and sober diplomacy is an important backdrop to understanding the strategic utility of the Provisional Understanding. Transparency without significant operational leverage fuels escalation and favors the coercer. In the same vein, sober diplomacy without consequences for non-compliance is nothing but appeasement. It simply invites repetition. 

Defeating Coercion at Sea

Both transparency and diplomacy failed to curb Chinese coercion in the lead-up to the Provisional Understanding. China has shown that it can absorb reputational costs. Absent any robust operational response, its internal assumptions may have concluded that a hit on its reputation was worth the gains of demonstrating to its own audience a firm and resolute response against any backlash. China can also afford to pay lip service to the diplomatic route after government messaging indicated no further response other than exposing coercive behavior.

Behind this backdrop, the Philippines continued planning to utilize other means of resupplying troops on BRP Sierra Madre, including riskier operations such as airdrops. Then, on the morning of June 17, what would have been a peaceful resupply mission became a test of wills between outnumbered, battered, but unyielding Philippine Navy personnel and China Coast Guard personnel. Videos of the violent incident quickly spread online and drew consternation from various sectors. 

The United States offered assistance in future resupply missions. Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro and General Brawner also announced the continuation of future missions and emphasized that there will be no change in the Philippine position and policy. Marcos, after a visit to the AFP Western Command Headquarters, declared that the Philippines would not change course despite the setback.

In coercive bargaining, such a demonstration of unity from above and across the ranks is decisive. For coercion to be successful and effective, it must change the target’s behavior or policy. At this point, China was faced with a fast-rising strategic cost – potential military escalation from the AFP, the possibility of direct U.S. intervention for future resupply missions, and widening distrust from the public that could spill over to other Chinese interests. The signal was clear to China: no amount of coercion will stop the Philippines from abandoning its declared position. Therefore, the strategic environment generated a strong incentive for China to accept a temporary modus vivendi.

A more clear-eyed assessment of the Provisional Understanding should take into account this particular context. It’s not that coercion succeeded and the Philippines capitulated. To the contrary, the deal emerged because coercion failed to accomplish Chinese objectives at acceptable costs to Beijing. Because the costs and risks of further violent engagements are rising for both sides, a temporary operational understanding became mutually tolerable.

The strategic lesson of the Provisional Understanding is that Philippine interests in Second Thomas Shoal were secured when demonstrated national resolve succeeded in limiting the ability of Chinese coercion to shape the behavior it demands. In short, coercion loses value if Manila denies the accomplishment of its objectives. Prolonged tension, therefore, is not always a liability – it can be the very condition that reshapes the terms of future bargaining.

Conclusion: A Limited Model

It is highly debatable whether the Second Thomas Shoal Model may be effective beyond the feature itself. In Sabina Shoal and Scarborough Shoal, for example, the strategic and operational conditions are fundamentally different. The Philippines does not maintain a permanent physical presence that can be sustainably defended. In these areas, China is not faced with the same operational dilemmas, not to mention that diplomatic and allied support does not seem to be at the same level as exists in Second Thomas Shoal.

Under these conditions, neither diplomacy nor transparency compensates for the absence of the persistent presence that BRP Sierra Madre provides. This is why China’s coercive pressure appears to continue – or even expand – despite public exposure. Trying to apply the Second Thomas Shoal experience without replicating the strategic, operational, and tactical environment that produced it is likely to fail.

Yet in the unique environment of Second Thomas Shoal, the Provisional Understanding is holding. Filipino negotiators seem to have built a deterrent factor into the unseen document that is affecting China’s escalation calculations. The Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs announced that 13 resupply missions have been conducted without incident. This much can be celebrated.

The danger today is not just the misbranding of the Provisional Understanding by various sectors, but the loss of the strategic lesson of the coercive bargaining that produced it. 

Chinese coercion was defeated by persistence that denied it success. The Philippines did not secure Second Thomas Shoal because various spokespersons made noise or diplomats placed the right words in the Provisional Understanding. The Philippines showed the world an antidote to coercion through quiet resolve: a president who refused to leave, an alliance that showed up at sea to signal support, a military that took calculated risks, and a Filipino public that accepted the price of managed escalation.

At some point, China will seek to revise or abandon the arrangement. The real question is whether Manila will have the same capacity to refuse and endure when that time comes.