Whilst everyone is talking about Constitutional Amendment No. 3 (CAB3) and its undesirability, the echoes of the succession crisis in 2017 get louder and louder.
Sometimes Zimbabweans seem to have very short memories, and all the complexities of 2017 have been airbrushed out of the picture. It is worth remembering 2017 and its implications for today.
The succession crisis in 2017 was resolved by a coup; calling it a “military assisted transition” is putting lipstick on a pig.
The coup was “cured” through a decision by the High Court that Section 212 of the constitution, whereby the army must “defend the country and the constitution”, allowed the army to decide themselves what constituted a threat to the country or the constitution. However, the relevant section of the constitution does not suggest this:
Section 212 (Function of Defence Forces):
The function of the Defence Forces is to protect Zimbabwe, its people, its national security and interests and its territorial integrity and to uphold this constitution.
A challenge to this decision was made by a group of citizens but dismissed by the Chief Justice in the Constitutional Court.
This avoided the thorny problem that the military cannot deploy themselves but can only be deployed through the agency of the president.
Section 213 of the constitution is unambiguously explicit on this, and the reasoning on this has been well-explained by Justice Mavedzenge. The constitution is clear:
Section 213 (Deployment of Defence Forces)
(1) Subject to this Constitution, only the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, has power—
(a) to authorise the deployment of the Defence Forces; or
(b) has power to determine the operational use of the Defence Forces.
Putting both sections together, it seems obvious that the military can only defend the constitution through the agency of the presidency, and through deployment by the president. It is doubtful that Robert Mugabe called in the military to remove himself or act against his wife.
We argued strongly in January 2018 that this was a coup, and furthermore that it could not be “cured” by an election. We remain to be convinced that we were wrong!
Thus, the polarised conflict within Zanu PF currently raises all manner of problems.
The first emerges from all the foregoing discussion and involves the very simple issue of whether a coup will be “cured” by another coup.
There is frequent reference to the idea of a looming coup, which may seem alarmist, but how else to interpret the statement by retired generals (and repeated by other retired generals) that the “military will advise accordingly” if the party persists in ensuring that CAB3 becomes law, and without proper consultation with the citizens?
War veterans, both Zipa and ZNLWVA, too are adding their voice to the generals, as is virtually every other constituency within the country.
The grounds for a repeat of 2017 could not be clearer. In this context, the “private” visit by South African President, Cyril Ramaphosa, is deeply worrying.
What was the purpose? To persuade the government against CAB3? Or to renew solidarity between two former liberation movements? Subsequent statement by Ramaphosa’s spokesman have made nothing clear.
The second problem also has echoes of 2017, and that is the suggestion that resolution of the succession crisis within Zanu PF can happen by merely changing leadership.
If replacing Mugabe with Emmerson Mnangagwa has not proved to be a success, then it can plausibly by asked whether replacing Mnagagwa with Constantino Chiwenga, whether by coup or not, be any better?
The problem as we have argued now for over a decade is not about the leadership in Zanu PF, it is about reform: not merely narrow reform, but reform that addresses the fact that the state is completely broken and needs considerably more than mere tinkering with leadership to fix the problem.
Zimbabwe cannot be fixed by changes of political power or political leaders: the whole political economy and the state itself need a total overhaul.
The deep problem, the national question, that was present at independence has never gone away, has never been addressed, except trivially, and will never go away without being faced square on. Interestingly, this point is now increasingly raised even in South Africa as William Gumede argues.
The point about the need for total overhaul of the state has been made repeatedly in all the Sapes Policy Dialogues over the past two years, but increasingly the participants have begun to point to the solution.
In successive dialogues, commentators have called for a national conference, the need for church leadership, a national dialogue, and even a National Transitional Authority.
Similar views were expressed by the churches in the SABBATH call in 2019, and even earlier in the church statement on the Zimbabwe We Want in 2007.
As opposed to coups or internal re-configuring of the ruling party, Zimbabweans have continuously pushed for comprehensive and inclusive dialogue, and as endlessly shown by multiple research studies, are massively opposed to one-man rule, one-party rule, or military rule.
Thus, CAB3 flies fully in the face of the citizens’ opposition to elite bargains, and from Lancaster House in 1980 to date, this is all they have been offered. We are now offered the same again: a constitutional amendment entrenching a small elite, effected by a handful of dubiously elected persons after an election that was rejected even by Zanu PF’s peers in the region.
So, what can be the way forward? Mining the conclusions from the SAPES Policy Dialogues, this seems very straight forward.
Firstly, reject CAB3 in its entirety. This is the clear conclusion from factions in Zanu PF, voices from the military, war veterans, the established churches (ZCC and ZHCOD), opposition political parties, civic platforms, labour, and many others.
The massive opposition shows that this bill if it passes does so completely illegitimately and will put in place a government with no legitimacy or international credibility.
Secondly, and if the massive pressure frightens parliament into doing the right thing, reject the idea that the next step must be to go to elections in 2028.
No election since 2000 has passed the test of freeness and fairness; all have led to serious dispute; some have led to extremely serious violence; all have led to negative assessments by international observers, and in 2023 even by Sadc; and one in 2008 leading to a forced government of national unity.
Elections in the absence of massive reforms cause problems, they don’t solve them.
Thirdly, recognise that the problem is not just Zanu PF, but a thoroughly broken state.
The pillars that allow peaceful resolution of conflict and change of government - an accountable executive, a vibrant legislature capable of executive oversight, and a wholly independent judiciary - do not exist in Zimbabwe.
This will be worsened by CAB3.
Furthermore, all state institutions are either dysfunctional or captured through corruption, and we have a comprador class diverting funds away from the economy on an industrial scale.
Thus, the reform needed is root and branch aimed at the entire state.
Fourthly, this is unlikely to be achieved by a government of national unity in a country as polarised as Zimbabwe. Our lessons on the effectiveness of GNUs should make us every clear here.
The post Lancaster government was hampered by the blocking minority seats agreed as a protection for White interests; the Unity Accord was a peace treaty and led to an unaccountable government and an increasingly powerful elite; and the Global Political Agreement was another peace treaty, producing 5 years of economic stability of a kind and no reforms of any magnitude bar a new constitution.
The constitution was again the product of an elite pact between political parties, already being picked apart by constitutional amendments: three of these if CAB3 succeeds.
The reforms needed can only come through a national effort, and hence the call for a national dialogue is extremely important.
This dialogue must be inclusive, chaired by an independent organ; involve the body politic way wider than political parties; consider not only the needed reform but also the mechanism by which this can be achieved; lay the ground for a non-disputed election at the end of the transition, and provide the reform agenda not merely for the transition, but for the post-transition period as well. This last point may seem contentious, but given the analysis above, a transition cannot achieve the extensive reforms in the short period of a transitional arrangement. All these points were made strongly by Sipho Malunga, Gladys Hlatshwayo, and Chofamba Sithole at the most recent Sapes Policy Dialogue.
*Ibbo Mandaza and Tony Reeler are co-conveners of the Platform for Concerned Citizens (PCC).
This is no new suggestion and proposal for a “soft” landing offers has been on the table for over a decade.
The proposal for a National Transitional Authority (NTA) was developed in 2016 to address the growing succession crisis within Zanu PF and the embedding of the military in the state, and even the fears that this could lead to a coup, which did happen.
If we accept the argument that in the current state of the country there is little possibility of government reform, either politically or economically, and this is the product of serious factional dispute within Zanu PF, and there is little that has changed since 2016, even worsening, then the only way out would seem to be national dialogue leading to a political settlement, and inevitably to a transitional interregnum prior to an election that is endorsed by the nation. If this cannot happen, then there is the probability of a “hard” landing.
As a final point, a continuous objection to the idea of an NTA has been that no party negotiates itself out of power, and only a crisis forces a transition. In all the transitions in Africa between 1988 and 2004, nearly 60% were negotiated, mostly by military rulers. Whilst domestic collapse and emergence from civil war were causes of transitions, mostly transitions were negotiated.
So, countries did take the option of a “soft” landing, mostly because the military rulers or the one-party government could not go on governing or needed to establish legitimacy.