ZIMBABWE’S vast deposits of platinum group metals, lithium, diamonds, gold and chromium have placed the southern African nation at the centre of a new scramble for Africa’s mineral wealth.
While the country’s geological endowment ranks among the richest on the planet, its economy remains stagnant, its institutions are fragile and its environment shows signs of severe degradation.
The paradox exemplifies the classic “resource curse” a phenomenon now being reshaped by Dutch disease dynamics and a shifting global balance of power that pits the United States, China and Russia against one another for strategic access to critical minerals.
The resource curse thesis argues that countries abundant in natural resources often experience slower economic growth, weaker governance and greater inequality than their resource-poor counterparts.
In Zimbabwe, mining revenues now account for roughly 27% of gross domestic product (GDP) and an even larger share of foreign exchange earnings, according to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. Yet the benefits have not translated into broad-based development.
“Zimbabwe has extracted billions of dollars worth of minerals over the past two decades,” Tendai Moyo, senior economist at the University of Zimbabwe, said.
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“We have little to show in terms of modern infrastructure, industrial diversification or human development outcomes. That is the essence of the resource curse.”
The symptoms mirror textbook Dutch disease. Large inflows of mining royalties have appreciated the Zimbabwean currency, eroding the competitiveness of agriculture and manufacturing.
In the 1990s, the country was a net exporter of maize and wheat; today, it imports much of its staple food, a reversal that is attributed directly to mining driven currency appreciation.
Environmental costs are equally stark. Unregulated artisanal and large scale extraction has polluted rivers with heavy metals, stripped forest cover around the Great Dyke, and caused land subsidence in lithium-rich basins.
According to the World Bank Report (2022) Communities near the Bikita and Masvingo projects report elevated instances of respiratory illness and reduced agricultural yields, prompting local non-governmental organisations to call for stronger environmental oversight.
Domestic mismanagement alone does not explain Zimbabwe’s current predicament. The global geopolitical landscape is increasingly dictating how its mineral wealth is mobilised.
According to the Financial Times articles (2022) on Lithium and “Resource-Backed Loans“ since 2022, Chinese state-backed firms have become the dominant investors in Zimbabwe’s lithium sector.
Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, a subsidiary of the Chinese giant, secured mining licences covering more than 150km² of the Bikita lithium belt. In exchange, Beijing has provided US$1,2 billion in low interest loans earmarked for road upgrades, power stations and a new processing plant near Masvingo.
Parallel to the Chinese influx, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (2022) reports on the Wagner Group provides regular updates and analysis on Wagner’s activities, financing and political ties in Africa.
The report states that Russia has deepened its presence through Rosatom and the controversial private military contractor, the Wagner Group.
It says Moscow has signed a memorandum of understanding to explore uranium extraction in the Mberengwa district.
Separately, Wagner operatives have been reported in the Chimanimani area, ostensibly providing security for mining sites.
While direct United States investment in Zimbabwe remains modest, Washington has begun capacity building programmes through the US Agency for International Development (USAid), focused on improving governance in the mining sector and bolstering civil society monitoring.
Moreover, the US International Development Finance Corporation has listed Zimbabwe as a “priority country” for future financing, contingent on meeting anti corruption benchmarks.
This softer, capacity-building approach stands in stark contrast to Washington’s deployment of hard power in other regions where its strategic interests are directly contested.
Considering the recent, intensified US actions against Venezuela to cripple a geopolitical rival’s oil-dependent economy, Washington has not only re-imposed crippling sanctions but also moved to seize assets, including aircraft and control over oil revenues linked to the state-owned PDVSA.
Norway’s experience after the discovery of offshore oil in the late 1960s is often cited as the gold standard for turning resource wealth into long-term prosperity.
Key elements of the Norwegian model include:
l High taxation and profit sharing: Over 78% of oil profits flow to the state;
l Sovereign wealth fund: The Government Pension Fund Global, now valued at more than US$1,4 trillion, invests abroad and shields the domestic economy from volatile commodity prices; and
l Robust institutions: A transparent legal framework, an independent central bank and a strong civil society oversight structure.
Zimbabwe lacks several of these preconditions. The country’s fiscal regime is characterised by low royalty rates and opaque licensing, while the judiciary and audit institutions are perceived as vulnerable to political interference.
Moreover, the absence of a sovereign wealth fund means that windfall revenues are rapidly consumed by debt service and short-term budget deficits.
Nonetheless, scholars such as Moyo argue that selective adoption could be beneficial. “Copying Norway won’t work,” he says.
“But Zimbabwe can adopt pieces: transparent licensing, community benefit sharing, reinvestment in education, and protecting the environment. The model must be homegrown, not imported.”
Regional peers provide alternative roadmaps. Nigeria, after the 2014 oil price crash, embarked on a series of reforms, improving debt sustainability, establishing a crude oil surveillance system and incentivising non oil sectors.
While progress has been uneven, the country now reports a modest rise in non oil GDP contribution.
Botswana offers another contrast. With diamond revenues, the nation built a stable macro economic environment, invested heavily in education and health, and created a sovereign wealth fund.
Crucially, Botswana’s political system has maintained a high degree of continuity and rule of law, factors often missing in other resource-rich states.
A consensus among analysts is clear: the decisive factor is how resources are governed, not the presence of minerals themselves. Several policy options have emerged.
l Transparent Licensing Regime — Publish all mining contracts, including tax rates and royalty structures, in a publicly accessible register;
l Revenue sharing mechanism — Allocate a fixed percentage of mining royalties to a National Development Fund, earmarked for infrastructure, health, and education;
l Strengthening anti-corruption agencies — Empower the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission with operational independence and adequate resources;
l Community benefit agreements — Require mining companies to negotiate legally binding agreements that guarantee local employment, skill transfer programmes and environmental remediation;
l Environmental standards — Adopt and enforce internationally recognised standards (e.g., the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, ISO 14001) for water management and land reclamation; and
l Diversification incentives — Offer tax breaks and credit facilities for agribusiness, manufacturing and renewable energy projects to counteract Dutch disease pressures.
Zimbabwe stands at a pivotal moment. Its mineral endowments provide a strategic lever in a world racing to secure the raw materials needed for a low carbon future.
Yet without robust institutions, transparent governance and an inclusive development strategy, the country risks deepening the very “resource curse” that has plagued it for decades.
The emerging geopolitical scramble, China’s capital-heavy lithium projects, Russia’s security-linked resource deals, and the US’ push for diversified, green supply chains adds a complex layer of external influence.
Whether these forces become catalysts for reform or merely new channels for elite capture will depend largely on the policy choices made in Zimbabwe’s parliament, ministries and courts.
For researchers, policymakers and investors alike, Zimbabwe offers a live case study of how geology, economics and international politics intersect in the 21st century.
The lesson is stark: resource wealth is a double-edged sword; its true value is realised only when the institutions that manage it are strong, transparent and accountable.
The next decade will determine whether Zimbabwe transforms its riches into a foundation for sustainable prosperity, or whether it remains, once again, a cautionary tale of mineral abundance without inclusive growth.
Nyawo is a development practitioner, writer and public speaker. New Perspectives — a weekly column published in the Zimbabwe Independent are coordinated by Lovemore Kadenge, an independent consultant, managing consultant of Zawale Consultants (Private) Limited, independent consultant, managing consultant of Zawale Consultants (Private) Limited, past president of the Zimbabwe Economics Society (ZES) and past president of the Chartered Governance & Accountancy Institute in Zimbabwe (CGAIZ). — kadenge.zes@gmail.com/ cell: +263 772 382 852.