ADDRESSING delegates during the G20 Global Leaders’ Summit, hosted in South Africa in November 2025, Vice-President Constantino Chiwenga said Zimbabwe is seeking inclusion in the G20 Common Framework (CF) for debt resolution. To quote from his speech, the VP said: “The G20 Common Framework for debt treatment requires significant strengthening, in view of this, Zimbabwe seeks inclusion and active participation in the improved G20 Common Framework for the debt treatment process, we are ready to engage constructively to that end, the journey for inclusive and sustainable growth demands political will and unwavering commitment to equitable development, let us reaffirm our corrective commitment to build a stronger, fairer, greener and more human global economy that leaves no one behind.”
Zimbabwe believes that being included in the G20 debt resolution system will restore multilateral financiers’ confidence in the economy and unlock new funding for development projects. South Africa’s presidency of the G20 failed to place the priorities of Africa at the heart of the G20 agenda. It fell short of advancing global financial architecture reforms.
Why it is not the best solution
Indeed, Zimbabwe’s development is being slowed by a debt overhang, Public and Publicly-Guaranteed, which stands at US$23,4 billion (44,7% of the country’s gross domestic product) as of the end of September 2025. The government is continuing with the slow and difficult discussions under the Arrears Clearance and Debt Resolution Process.
The process is somehow stuck given the departure of one of its Champions, Akinwumi Adesina, former president of the African Development Bank (AfDB) and an evaluation of the first phase of the process by the AfDB yet to be commissioned.
The G20 CF is not a lasting solution to Zimbabwe’s debt crisis. It has failed to deliver swift and effective debt resolution to African countries such as Zambia, Chad, Ghana and Ethiopia. Instead, the process has consistently prioritised private sector profits, while shifting losses onto already weakened governments. Restructuring processes are slow, debt reductions too shallow, and the sharing of responsibility between public and private creditors deeply unequal.
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In April and November 2020, the G20 established the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) and the Common Framework (CF), respectively, to address debt vulnerabilities exacerbated by the Covid-19 health pandemic shock. The G20 CF was established to coordinate the Paris Club, non-Paris Club, and private creditors in the provision of debt relief to DSSI-eligible countries on a case-by-case basis.
Since its establishment, it has been accessed by only four African countries (Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana and Zambia). The CF is not comprehensive. Countries requesting debt relief will have to appear before “bilateral creditor committees” that coordinate the creditors. The debtor country’s debt relief needs will be based on IMF-WB debt sustainability analysis (DSA) rather than its development financing needs.
The country must implement an International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme throughout the duration of the debt relief, and the IMF demands greater transparency and accountability on debt relief savings spending.
Eligibility for the CF is limited to Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) eligible countries. Zimbabwe is currently a PRGT -eligible country having cleared of its arrears to the IMF in October 2016. The IMF restored the country’s eligibility to access concessional financing.
Many debtor countries fear participating in the CF due to the risk of losing access to capital markets and potential rating downgrades. Participation of private creditors still remains voluntary. While, the CF debt treatments offer a way to pause payments and bring together official creditors and debtors, it lacks an enforcement mechanism to get private creditors on board. Zimbabwe has a Global Compensation Deed between the government and former farm owners that has created a large debt of US$3,5 billion.
Critical lessons
As of 2026, four African countries have formally requested a debt treatment under the CF. These are Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana and Zambia. Zambia was the first to receive debt relief in 2023. Chad reached an agreement on a contingent treatment in 2022. Ghana reached an agreement in 2024 and Ethiopia requested treatment in early 2021.
There are many critical lessons Zimbabwe should pick from the experiences of countries under the CF. Positively, these debtor countries have used the framework to bring together Paris Club and non-Paris Club creditors for coordinated debt relief, especially China.
When entering debt negotiations, a detailed, comprehensive, and publicly-available database of all debt obligations is a must. Zambia and Ghana’s delays in reaching agreements was a result of data reconciliation issues. To earn creditors’ trust, Zimbabwe will have to disclose hidden liabilities, commercial, state-owned enterprise and collateralised debt.
Official creditors require that private lenders (bondholders) and other non-Paris Club creditors offer terms as those agreed in the Official Creditor Committee. This is what they call comparable treatment. Zambia delays were due to private bondholders refusing to accept same haircuts as official creditors. Zimbabwe must structure its debt treatment to ensure fair burden-sharing across all creditor classes to avoid protracted negotiations.
The CF is too slow process. Debt treatment negotiations took years. Zambia took over three years to reach an agreement. Zimbabwe there would require a long-term strategy that combines immediate IMF-backed economic reforms such as the Staff-Monitored Programme (SMP).
A CF debt treatment requires IMF-supported programme to ensure debt sustainability. Zimbabwe must accelerate its Arrears Clearance and Debt Resolution strategy, focusing on restoring the SMP with the IMF to unlock the necessary technical and financial support.
By implementing these lessons, particularly the need for transparent data and coordinated engagement with all creditors, Zimbabwe can better navigate the complexities of the G20 CF.
Conclusion
Zimbabwe’s quest for inclusion in an unreformed Common framework will not solve the country’s debt crisis. The Common Framework must be reformed for it to deliver.
Zimbabwe’s efforts to secure a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (2027–2028 term) have received a significant boost, from Russia, Cuba, India and an endorsement by Sadc and other regional organisations, if secured the country should champion initiatives for an intergovernmental process to address the gaps in debt architecture, which should lead to a UN framework Convention on Sovereign Debt, as agreed at the FFD4 Conference in July 2025. Zimbabwe should equally champion the Borrower’s Forum, which “will offer debt-distressed countries a way to coordinate action and amplify their voice in the global financial system” as agreed at FFD4 conference.
Mutazu is a political economy analyst and current interim policy, research and advocacy manager at Afrodad. These weekly Perspectives articles, published in the Zimbabwe Independent, are coordinated by Lovemore Kadenge, an independent, managing consultant of Zawale Consultants (Pvt) Ltd, past president of the Zimbabwe Economics Society and past president of the Chartered Governance & Accountancy Institute in Zimbabwe. — kadenge.zes@gmail.com or mobile: +263 772 382 852.