Zimbabwe’s financial inclusion story has long been measured through the lens of basic access to financial products.

Over the past decade, mobile penetration surged, digital wallets scaled, and millions who once operated outside the formal banking system entered it through their phones. It stands as one of the country’s most significant structural shifts. In fact, alongside continental success stories such as M‑Pesa, MTN MoMo, Orange Money, and Airtel Money, Zimbabwe’s EcoCash is often cited as one of Africa’s leading mobile money innovations. But inclusion built on digital rails introduces a new vulnerability.

Trust can now be compromised without breaching a single server. In February, authorities arrested eleven suspects linked to phishing scams that targeted more than 30 EcoCash users and allegedly siphoned over US$61 000. Crucially, the method was not a technical breach of the platform. According to investigators, the system itself was never hacked. Instead, the attack relied entirely on social engineering.

Fraudsters reportedly circulated fake links offering free data, redirecting victims to counterfeit portals designed to harvest personal information. The victims were then contacted and persuaded to share their one-time passwords. Once those credentials were voluntarily disclosed, funds were quietly drained from their wallets. The infrastructure held; human trust was exploited. That distinction matters.

In a digital economy, cybersecurity is no longer confined to firewalls, encryption, and server integrity. It is behavioural. It sits at the intersection of technology, psychology, and governance. Social engineering works because it exploits urgency and authority. A promise of free data taps into economic pressure. A phone call that sounds official creates perceived legitimacy. In a moment of distraction, caution is lowered. Yet the implications go far beyond individual financial loss. Zimbabwe’s financial architecture increasingly depends on digital platforms. Mobile money facilitates SME transactions, remittances, school fees, payroll processing, and informal market trade.

For many households and small businesses, a digital wallet is the primary interface with formal finance. If users begin to feel exposed, even when the platform itself remains technically secure, behaviour shifts. People hold lower balances. They transact more cautiously. Some revert to cash. Informal settlement systems regain ground. That defensive response has macroeconomic consequences.

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When digital transaction volumes weaken, financial footprints shrink. Credit scoring becomes more difficult. Savings mobilisation slows. Tax collection efficiency is affected. Monetary policy transmission loses effectiveness because digital channels now form a central part of how money circulates in the economy. In this sense, social engineering fraud becomes more than a consumer protection issue. It becomes a financial stability issue. Consequently, it needs to be elevated to the higher pedestal of policy ecosystem.

Financial inclusion rests on three pillars: access, affordability, and financial literacy. However, trust is a key vehicle in driving financial inclusion. Zimbabwe has made meaningful progress on access. But trust must be continuously reinforced. Cybersecurity, therefore, should be treated as a core economic policy instrument. Regulators and financial institutions must view operational resilience as integral to macroeconomic stability. Supervisory frameworks should incorporate robust fraud monitoring, clear disclosure protocols and coordinated response mechanisms. Telecommunications regulators, financial service providers, and law enforcement agencies must operate within aligned systems. Fragmented oversight increases vulnerability.

The February arrests demonstrate that enforcement capacity exists. Information in the public domain suggests that devices were recovered and suspects were remanded, sending an important signal that digital crime will be pursued.

Mambure is a business leader and public policy scholar. He is a chartered marketer and fellow of the CIM (UK)and holds an MBA, Master in Public Policy and Government and an MSc in Marketing. — dnmambure@gmail.com.

It is however not a contested assertion that enforcement is inherently reactive. Prevention requires scale, consistency, and repetition. Public education must be ongoing and clear.

The public should be made aware that no legitimate financial institution will ever request a pin or one-time-password through a phone call, SMS, or messaging platform. Suspicious links that promise incentives should be ignored. Only official channels should be used. Fraud should be reported immediately. Digital financial literacy now includes cyber awareness.

There is also a competitiveness dimension. Zimbabwe has articulated ambitions around export growth, SME formalisation, and digital innovation. Digital payments generate transaction histories. Transaction histories enable access to credit. Credit enables business expansion and cross border trade participation. If fear undermines digital participation, that progression weakens. International investors increasingly assess cyber governance when evaluating country exposure. They examine fraud prevalence, data protection regimes, and institutional response capacity. Even where systems are technically secure, persistent social engineering incidents can influence perception. Perception influences risk pricing. Risk pricing influences the cost of capital.

Reputation in a digital economy is closely tied to cyber resilience. For corporates, cybersecurity should not be treated as a compliance expense but rather a trust investment. Financial services operate on confidence. When confidence erodes, customer behaviour changes quickly. Transparent communication during incidents strengthens credibility. Clear explanations and visible corrective measures build reassurance. Silence invites speculation. The broader lesson is straightforward. Economic systems function because people believe they are safe. In the past, that belief centred on physical banks and regulatory institutions. Today, it increasingly rests on digital interfaces.

If Zimbabwe intends to deepen financial inclusion, strengthen financial stability and enhance competitiveness, digital trust must be treated as public infrastructure. It requires coordinated governance, disciplined regulation, institutional investment, and informed citizens. The February phishing syndicate exploited individuals, not systems. But the implications are systemic. In a digitised financial ecosystem, safeguarding trust is as critical as safeguarding capital buffers. Cybersecurity has moved from the technical back office to the centre of economic policy. It is, increasingly, the new financial stability policy.

Mambure is a business leader and public policy scholar. He is a chartered marketer and fellow of the CIM (UK)and holds an MBA, Master in Public Policy and Government and an MSc in Marketing. — dnmambure@gmail.com.