REPORTS indicate that Zimbabwe currently has around 107 state-owned companies/state-owned entities (SOCs/SOEs).
These include the Zesa Holdings (Zesa), National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), Zimbabwe National Water Authority (Zinwa), the Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company (ZCDC), the Zimbabwe National Roads Administration (Zinara), the Civil Aviation Authority of Zimbabwe (CAAZ), Air Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Tourism Authority (ZTA), and the Zimbabwe Women’s Microfinance Bank, among others.
Several of these SOCs require urgent reform to regain financial and governance viability, as many are in poor condition.
A number have become dysfunctional, imposing costs on the broader economy. They have also emerged as fiscal vulnerabilities, frequently relying on state bailouts whenever they become insolvent or undercapitalised.
Incompetence, corruption and political interference have been widely cited as key root causes behind their decline. Some experts argue that the ownership and control models governing local SOCs lie at the heart of these problems. They contend that the structures must be overhauled.
Singapore’s experience offers a potentially useful model for managing SOCs in line with international best practice.
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However, given the socio-economic differences between the two countries, certain elements of the Singaporean approach may not be compatible with Zimbabwe’s context and would need to be adapted. This will be explored further below.
Singapore experience
In Singapore, the People’s Action Party (PAP) has governed since independence in 1965. Its system has been described as “soft authoritarianism”, authoritarian constitutionalism or authoritarian pragmatism — rendering the country an illiberal democracy.
In pursuit of economic prosperity, Singapore embarked on an ambitious industrialisation programme that gained momentum in the early 1970s. State-owned companies were chosen as the main drivers of growth and industrialisation.
In 1974, Singapore commercialised its SOCs by establishing a state-owned investment company,
Temasek Holdings, which assumed shareholding in various SOCs on behalf of government. This bears some resemblance to Zimbabwe’s Mutapa Investment Fund (MIF), although the latter remains in its infancy and may ultimately take a different path.
Temasek is governed by a competent board of directors that manages the affairs of Singapore’s SOCs, creating a buffer between politicians, often less skilled in commercial management, and company leadership.
To this day, Singapore’s SOCs, also known as government-linked companies (GLCs), report to Temasek’s board, which provides strategic direction and ensures accountability.
The objective was to minimise interference from politically appointed officials and reduce corruption, incompetence and the erosion of professional management.
Both Temasek and the GLCs are incorporated under Singapore’s Companies Act as private companies rather than traditional state entities.
They are not subject to additional public-sector legislation such as the Public Finance Management Act common in jurisdictions such as Zimbabwe. This reduces overregulation, inconsistency and statutory overlaps that can complicate governance and operations. Temasek performs shareholder functions on behalf of government. It began in 1974 with 35 companies valued at about US$354 million; by 2022, its portfolio had grown to roughly US$403 billion.
The state owns Temasek through the minister of Finance in a representative shareholder role.
Singapore’s government recognised early that politicians and civil servants were not ideal custodians of commercial enterprises, and that policymaking and regulatory roles often conflict with direct ownership responsibilities.
Temasek allows mixed ownership structures, including foreign participation, and sometimes holds minority stakes. It pursues a clear commercial mandate with limited political interference.
Dividends flow to government for national development and social welfare, while retained profits are reinvested into expanding the enterprises. Companies that fail to maximise value are divested. In contrast, many struggling SOCs in Zimbabwe continue to be retained despite persistent losses, placing strain on the fiscus and the economy.
Although Temasek and its subsidiaries operate on commercial principles, they remain accountable to government as shareholder.
This differs from Zimbabwe, where officials are often reported to interfere in commercial decisions, weakening boards and undermining governance. When Temasek or its subsidiaries seek to draw from reserves accumulated from past profits, presidential authorisation is required, encouraging financial discipline.
In Zimbabwe, SOCs frequently receive bailouts, guarantees and capital injections from the Ministry of Finance with limited resistance.
Today, Singapore’s SOCs often outperform even top-performing private companies listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange.
Efficiency is further enhanced by grouping technically related companies under unified structures. For instance, aviation-related SOCs operate under the Singapore Airlines Group, covering engineering, passenger services, cargo, data systems and airport management.
Shared services and expertise generate economies of scale and operational synergies. Stronger entities within a group may support weaker ones before government assistance is sought.
In Zimbabwe, by contrast, most SOCs operate with separate boards and limited coordination.
The Singaporean government is an active but non-intrusive shareholder. It maintains oversight while allowing Temasek’s board operational autonomy, insulating companies from political pressure and reinforcing commercial discipline.
Government receives regular performance updates and participates only in major strategic decisions. Direct political involvement in routine operational matters is rare.
Temasek itself adopts a similar “defensive shareholder” approach toward its subsidiaries, intervening only when accountability measures such as board restructuring are necessary.
This distance has resulted in greater board independence than even many private companies enjoy. To boost efficiency, Singapore’s SOCs which share some technical similarities, are managed by a single board of directors, instead of having a board for each SOC.
As an example, Singapore companies in the aviation industry are grouped under the banner of the “Singapore Airlines Group”, which covers SOCs in aviation engineering, passenger airlines, cargo (freight), data systems, airport management companies, etc. The entire group can thus extract synergies or scale-economy advantages from shared services and expertise, which is more operationally and financially sustainable.
SOCs can leverage the group balance sheet, through borrowing from successful companies within the group, or cross-subsidisation, before requesting a bailout from government, when facing financial difficulties.
In Zimbabwe, however, the general rule is that each SOC should have its own board of directors.
Temasek also draws on international expertise through advisory panels composed of global business leaders and policymakers.
Its companies are encouraged to recruit top international talent, including CEOs where local capacity is limited — a practice still uncommon in Zimbabwe.
Challenges for Zimbabwe
While Singapore’s experience offers valuable lessons, Zimbabwe cannot adopt the model wholesale.
Structural challenges, including the legacy of colonialism, poverty and inequality, mean that some SOCs cannot operate purely on commercial terms. Entities such as Zesa, Zinwa, Zinara and NRZ must balance financial sustainability with developmental mandates such as poverty reduction, equitable access to services and economic growth. Delivering essential services below market cost inevitably constrains profitability.
A twin-track ownership and control framework may, therefore, be more appropriate. Commercially-oriented companies could be placed under a Temasek-like structure, potentially through the Mutapa Investment Fund, including entities such as Kuvimba Mining House, Cottco, POSB and NetOne. These firms should report solely through MIF rather than directly to ministers, and operate under the Companies Act rather than overlapping public-sector statutes.
A second cluster of SOCs with developmental mandates could be supervised by a central agency modelled on China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission.
This body would discharge ownership and oversight functions while remaining insulated from political interference, thereby improving efficiency and governance outcomes.
Beyond structural reform, Zimbabwe’s leadership must rebuild a culture of integrity and public service that has eroded over time. The normalisation of wealth accumulation without transparent effort has weakened institutional ethics. Strong “zero tolerance for corruption” campaigns, combined with governance reforms, would be essential precursors to any successful reform programme.
If a Temasek-like model were implemented effectively, Zimbabwe could eventually earn the moniker “Zimbabwe Inc.” echoing “Singapore Inc.” — a reflection of disciplined, corporate-style management of state assets and enterprises.
Tutani is a political economy analyst. —tutanikevin@gmail.com.