OK Zimbabwe Limited, tottering on the brink months before panicky directors surrendered the business to a corporate rescue practitioner, bled over US$1 million through discounted asset sell-offs and one massive blunder, the Zimbabwe Independent can exclusively reveal.
A probe into the giant’s final months before its February 2026 plunge into administration exposed a pattern of distress selling, governance failures and cash leakages that saw the former retail bellwether haemorrhage fortunes through discounted property sales and a costly procurement blunder also reported by this newspaper last week.
Documents presented to creditors by corporate rescue practitioner Bulisa Mbano showed, in a last-ditch effort to contain haemorrhage, OK Zimbabwe sold prime real estate across major cities below market value, bleeding about US$630 000 in the process.
But the real crisis unfolds in how the proceeds from these deals were surrendered to banks and legacy creditors almost immediately after hitting the accounts, suffocating attempts to revive operations.
The fast-paced events were triggered by a May 30, 2025 board resolution authorising directors to raise US$10,4 million through property disposals. By the time the exercise ended, US$8,7 million had been generated.
Much of that war chest never reached the tills.
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“Proceeds from the sales of the properties were utilised for working capital requirements, paying off bank loans and settling old supplier balances,” Mbano said in his report.
“Some suppliers agreed to resume supplies once 50% of their balances was paid. Unfortunately, the suppliers did not subsequently supply OKZL and rather proceeded to demand for the remaining balances,” he said.
What emerges is a picture of a company in panic mode, selling strategic assets to fund short-term obligations in a cycle that eroded both value and operational capacity.
A review of the transactions showed OK systematically accepted discounts on key properties. OK Mbuya Nehanda in Harare, valued at US$3,21 million, was sold for US$3,1 million, resulting in a US$110 000 loss. OK Gweru, valued at US$2,7 million, went for US$2,5 million, bleeding the business US$200 000. OK Malvern in Waterfalls, Harare, valued at US$1,42 million, was sold for US$1,3 million, translating into a
US$120 000 loss. A Workington, Harare, warehouse valued at US$3,7 million, was disposed of for US$3,5 million, with OK taking a US$200 000 hit.
In total, the company absorbed at least US$630 000 in direct write-downs from these transactions alone, excluding further losses from delayed payments, taxes and the strategic cost of disposing income-generating assets.
Combined with a US$560 000 procurement blunder linked to the 2024 OK Grand Challenge, the group’s losses from these two episodes alone approach US$1 million.
Crucially, inflows from the disposals failed to translate into meaningful liquidity. Properties in Gweru and Malvern, sold for a combined US$3,8 million, saw US$2,6 million immediately diverted to settle debt owed to NBS Bank, sharply reducing usable cash.
Proceeds from the Mbuya Nehanda deal were used to clear bank guarantees issued to suppliers, but only one of three resumed deliveries after payment. In another transaction, OK received just US$1,825 million from the Workington warehouse sale, with the balance still tied up pending tax clearance by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority.
This meant that while the company reported US$8,7 million generated from the transactions, a significant portion of those funds was either absorbed by lenders, locked in regulatory processes, or used to settle historical obligations. Very little was left to stabilise operations.
The document showed efforts to use the proceeds to restore supply chains also failed. Even after partial settlements, some suppliers refused to resume deliveries and instead demanded full payment. These back-offs demonstrated waves of collapsing confidence in the business, proving fatal for a retailer dependent on supplier credit to stock its shelves.
The asset disposals were only one part of a broader collapse driven by operational and governance failures. In 2024, OK Zimbabwe duplicated the procurement of vehicles for its flagship OK Grand Challenge promotion, buying 62 vehicles instead of 31, at a cost of US$560 000.
“You would have killed the business,” Mbano said, reflecting the scale of OK bosses’ blunder.
The document said OK diverted working capital into failed investments, including US$5 million into Food Lovers Market, US$3 million into a Bon Marché outlet in Marondera, and US$800 000 into Alowell Pharmacies. None of these ventures generated returns and were eventually closed.
Currency instability compounded the crisis. Revenues collected in Zimbabwe Gold lost value as the exchange rate deteriorated, triggering a severe liquidity crunch. As cash dried up, suppliers withdrew, shelves emptied and revenues collapsed, plunging from US$21,7 million in January 2024 to just US$1,3 million by January this year.
Inventory write-offs surged to US$2,6 million, while fixed costs remained high.
By the time the board moved to place the company under corporate rescue, damage had already been inflicted.
The disposals that were meant to save OK Zimbabwe instead accelerated its decline, stripping it of valuable assets, draining liquidity and failing to restore supplier confidence.
What remained was a weakened business, burdened by debt, operational inefficiencies and a fractured supply chain.
Mbano said a formal investigation into the company’s affairs would now be undertaken.
“An investigation and examination of the affairs of the company pursuant to Section 134 of the Insolvency Act will be instituted,” he said.
He added that while the model remained viable, rebuilding the business would require fresh capital and the repair of strained supplier relationships.
“It is promising that the company is going to be turned around, but it will take hard work because suppliers were really affected. They are not happy, far from happy,” Mbano said.
Once a dominant force in Zimbabwe’s retail sector, OK Zimbabwe’s crisis now stands as a case study of how distress selling, weak controls and strategic missteps can bring down even the most established brands.