PRESIDENT Emmerson Mnangagwa may have done much to keep the economy afloat over the past decade, but his legacy in local government may well be that of a leader who sacrificed local authorities while seeking to be seen as a benevolent benefactor.

The Auditor-General’s 2025 Audit Report on Local Authorities paints a bleak picture of Zimbabwe’s councils.

Public finance management remains deeply unsatisfactory.

Worse still, most local authorities did not receive their constitutionally mandated transfers from central government.

Treasury, in its wisdom, appears to have trampled on the Constitution’s clear and unambiguous provisions governing devolution funds.

Section 301(3) of the Constitution states: “Not less than 5% of the national revenues raised in any financial year must be allocated to the provinces and local authorities as their share in that year.”

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Treasury has no discretion to ignore this mandatory requirement to allocate at least 5% of national revenue to provincial and local authorities.

The Constitution does, however, grant Treasury discretion over the distribution of those funds among local authorities, taking into account factors such as the need to provide basic services — including education, healthcare, water, roads, social amenities and electricity — particularly in marginalised areas, as well as the fiscal capacity, efficiency, development needs and economic disparities among provinces and local authorities.

According to The Mirror, a Masvingo-based newspaper, 86 local authorities received no devolution disbursements from Treasury. Only six local authorities reportedly received funding: Harare City Council, Chitungwiza Municipality, Gokwe North Rural District Council, Masvingo Rural District Council and Chivi Rural District Council.

Association of Rural District Councils of Zimbabwe secretary-general Isaac Matsilele lamented the situation, saying it was widening the gap between urban and rural councils.

“The urban-rural gap remains wide as RDCs rely on the fund to carry out developmental projects. Sometimes government comes up with new priorities and doesn't inform councils or stakeholders that finances are being rerouted,” Matsilele said.

Local Government ministry spokesperson Gabriel Masvora said allocated funds are not carried over into the next financial year.

“Section 31 of the Public Finance Management Act provides that public funds appropriated for the service of a financial year lapse at the close of that financial year,” he said.

“Consequently, unutilised or undisbursed appropriations are not rolled over into the next financial year, and no balances accrue from one fiscal year to another.”

First, it appears Treasury merely includes devolution allocations in the national budget without any genuine intention of disbursing the money.

Over the years, councils have consistently complained that their allocations are shrinking.

The obvious question is: Why does Treasury continue to disregard the Constitution?

For years, Treasury has breached constitutional provisions without consequence.

For instance, it has repeatedly failed to table reports on public debt within the constitutionally prescribed 60-day period after debts are contracted.

Second, Treasury’s senior leadership — the minister and the permanent secretary — have, on numerous occasions, ignored invitations to appear before parliamentary portfolio committees to provide oral evidence, yet no sanctions have followed.

This apparent impunity has arguably emboldened senior Treasury officials into believing they are accountable to no one, not even Parliament.

Third, Treasury has been derelict in carrying out its oversight responsibilities.

Year after year, the Auditor-General has produced reports highlighting widespread failures by local authorities to comply with the Public Finance Management Act.

Many councils have failed to submit accounts for audit altogether.

Others have received adverse audit opinions, while in some cases the Auditor-General has been unable to express an opinion because of inadequate financial records.

Yet Treasury, as the country’s fiscal authority, has taken little visible action against accounting officers — town clerks, town secretaries and chief executive officers — who preside over these persistent governance failures.

It increasingly appears that central government is unwilling to act against officials whose appointments it ultimately approves.

Accounting officers at local authorities are vetted through the Local Government Board.

The perception is that this amounts to cadre deployment, with the appointing authority unwilling to hold its own appointees accountable when serious governance failures occur.

By contrast, South Africa’s National Treasury recently announced that it would withhold certain transfers to municipalities experiencing severe financial distress.

Nearly 70 municipalities were affected, including the City of Johannesburg.

The South African government has demonstrated that it takes local government seriously.

It disburses constitutionally allocated funds but also disciplines underperforming municipalities by withholding additional funding until governance concerns are addressed.

This raises another important question: Why is the Mnangagwa administration seemingly reluctant to enforce accountability within Zimbabwe’s local authorities?

Some observers argue that the weakening of councils creates conditions that favour the expansion of privatised service delivery.

Increasingly, services such as water provision, waste management and road maintenance have been outsourced to private contractors.

Questions have repeatedly been raised about who benefits from these tenders.

Over the past two years, the Presidential Borehole Scheme has become one of the administration's flagship interventions.

Managed directly from the Office of the President, the programme has drilled boreholes in urban areas, rural communities and farming districts.

Supporters view it as a practical response to water shortages.

Critics, however, argue that it allows the Presidency to deliver services directly while elected local authorities, weakened by chronic underfunding, are left looking ineffective.

To them, it reflects a broader reluctance to embrace devolution as envisaged in the Constitution.

Indeed, the principle of devolution survived the Constitution Amendment No. 3 process, despite concerns among some that there was growing preference for greater centralisation of power.

Whether deliberate or not, Zimbabwe’s local authorities continue to weaken under the combined weight of inadequate funding, poor governance and weak accountability.

Whoever succeeds in rebuilding them will inherit an enormous task.

Parliament still has an opportunity to exercise meaningful oversight by demanding clear explanations from Treasury on why constitutionally mandated devolution funds are not being fully disbursed and why stronger action is not taken against councils that repeatedly fail basic public financial management standards.

I'm out.