POLITICAL analysts warn Zimbabwe could be headed for a prolonged political stalemate this year as tensions intensify between the ruling Zanu PF and opposition actors over the controversial “2030 agenda”, a stand-off they say could test constitutional provisions governing elections.

The analysts argue that any attempt to extend President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s tenure beyond the constitutionally-mandated two terms is likely to meet sustained resistance from some Zanu PF factions, opposition forces, civil society and sections of the public, making political consensus elusive.

They say the issue risks deepening political polarisation at a time when the country is already under severe economic strain.

Zanu PF recently disclosed that it has begun taking steps to implement a party resolution aimed at extending Mnangagwa’s term beyond 2028.

Party officials say internal processes are underway to operationalise the resolution, reigniting debate around constitutionalism and succession within the ruling party.

Political analyst Maxwell Saungweme said both Zanu PF and the opposition were already in campaign mode, with economic pressures emerging as a key driver of the political landscape.

Keep Reading

“I understand there could be other things happening within the opposition, trying to regroup to prepare for 2028,” he said.

 “Already, Nelson Chamisa has indicated that he is bouncing back. Zanu PF is also in an electoral mode as well.

“They are also trying to implement the 2030 agenda, more or less what they were saying last year, trying to maybe move steps,” Saungweme added.

He said the deteriorating economy, particularly rising taxation, was likely to shape political behaviour across the divide.

“I think it’s the economy, which is hitting hard on everyone. We have seen a lot of tax issues, a lot of taxation, and more taxation being imposed. This is going to cause a lot of anger in the country,” Saungweme said.

“Some of that anger will translate into political machinations and political moves, either the opposition capitalising on them, or the Zanu PF government itself reversing some of the taxes imposed by the minister.”

He dismissed suggestions that the 2030 agenda was a calculated tactic designed to confuse the opposition.

“I don’t think Zanu PF has that level of sophistication to trick the opposition over 2030. They are very clear about what they want,” Saungweme pointed out.

“They don’t use strategic ambiguity. If anything, within Zanu PF itself, the elite coalition remains an issue.

“It’s not very clear which cards Vice-President Constantino Chiwenga is playing, whether there will be cohesion, and you also have the influence of figures such as Kudakwashe Tagwirei. But I think within Zanu PF they are really serious about the 2030 agenda,” he added.

Saungweme also warned against narrowly defining opposition politics as the domain of formal parties alone.

“The challenge we have had in Zimbabwe is thinking that the opposition is just the MDC or the CCC (Citizens Coalition for Change),” he said.

“The potential lies in other groupings of progressive Zimbabweans — civil society, labour and constitutional movements such as those active around 2000. The potential for them to regroup could send shockwaves through Zanu PF.”

Saungweme said widespread social and economic grievances provided fertile ground for political reorganisation.

“There is a lot of anger and many grievances that need to be capitalised on to transform them into political capital, which unfortunately the main opposition has failed to do,” he said.

“But there is still potential. We still have the human capital and the brain power. The question is whether people realise that, beyond the struggle for jobs and livelihoods, they also have an obligation to free Zimbabwe from its problems.”

However, analyst Reuben Mbofana struck a more pessimistic note, arguing that there was currently no visible political structure capable of mounting a credible challenge to Zanu PF.

“Opposition politics in Zimbabwe is a concern. For you to predict a trajectory, you must first see something take off. If it was a plane, you would at least see it on the runway, loading passengers, beginning its ascent,” Mbofana said.

“But as far as Zimbabwe is concerned, we do not even have the aeroplane. It is not even at the airport.

“So, how do we expect it to take off or reach the clouds if it does not exist in the first place?” he asked.

Mbofana said the absence of a coherent opposition structure made it difficult to forecast political outcomes ahead of future elections.

“We do not have an opposition in Zimbabwe. We cannot talk about Sengezo Tshabangu, and we cannot talk about other pretenders or the more than 20 so-called opposition parties. They do not constitute an opposition,” he said.

He pointed to the fallout from the 2023 elections, marked by recalls of elected CCC legislators and councillors and the subsequent by-elections, as evidence of deepening fragmentation and institutional weakness within opposition politics.

Political risk analyst Wellington Muzengeza said the opposition landscape reflected a tragedy of squandered possibility.

“The CCC, once the vessel of democratic hope and the repository of popular discontent, now drifts rudderless, orphaned by its own leadership,” he said.

“The appearance of Nelson Chamisa at the December 2025 charity gala was emblematic of a broader drift in Zimbabwe’s opposition politics, a moment marked more by personal projection than strategic clarity.

“His demeanour suggested a self-assigned centrality to the national discourse, as though he alone possessed the solution to every crisis confronting the republic, yet his vague allusion to a new movement in 2026 did not signal a bold repositioning; instead, it resembled a retreat, a tentative gesture that revealed a troubling absence of coherent strategy or institutional foresight.”

Muzengeza said in a political terrain demanding precision and resilience, such ambiguity risks deepening the vacuum he was once expected to fill.

Political analyst Sydicks Muradzikwa says the ruling Zanu PF is likely to face visible internal fissures as early as 2026, driven by intensifying anxieties around the controversial 2030 agenda.

He argues that tensions within the party will increasingly pit proponents of continuity beyond 2028 against those insisting on strict adherence to constitutional term limits.

While these divisions are unlikely to result in an outright split, Muradzikwa says they will manifest through factional manoeuvring and carefully calibrated public messaging.

“As the 2030 agenda sharpens political power anxieties, senior figures, who have largely remained quiet, are expected to begin jostling for relevance, particularly as succession calculations harden and 2028 draws closer,” he said.

Despite the growing bickering, Muradzikwa believes the 2030 agenda will gain more traction than before as political timelines shorten.

Allies of President Emmerson Mnangagwa, he said, will increasingly push the logic of stability and incumbency to justify continuity.