ZIMBABWE has every reason to celebrate an exceptional 2025-26 agricultural season. A maize harvest of about 2,7 million tonnes has restored national food sufficiency, wheat is on course for another self-sufficient year and granaries are fuller than they have been in years.
But this bumper harvest must not breed complacency.
The real story is not today’s bumper harvest. It is tomorrow’s looming drought.
IH Securities new Agriculture Sector Report delivers a sobering assessment. El Niño is no longer a possibility; it is confirmed.
Forecasts indicate it will strengthen through the final quarter of 2026 before peaking between November and January — precisely when Zimbabwe’s summer crops will be establishing and filling grain.
With over 90% of the country’s cropping still dependent on rainfall, the implications are staggering.
History offers little comfort.
The report notes that the poor agricultural seasons of 2015-16, 2019-20 and 2023-24 were all El Niño induced.
Even more worrying, 11 of the last 13 El Niño events since 1982 produced below-trend maize yields, demonstrating a remarkably consistent relationship between the climate phenomenon and declining staple food production.
Zimbabwe should remember what happened only two years ago.
The 2023-24 El Niño-induced drought devastated agriculture, forcing millions to require food assistance and dragging national economic growth to below 2% in 2024.
Agriculture remains deeply intertwined with Zimbabwe’s wider economy.
When farmers harvest less, agro-processing slows, transport volumes decline, exports weaken, consumer spending contracts and rural incomes evaporate.
Yet despite these lessons, official economic projections continue to assume robust GDP growth.
That optimism deserves scrutiny.
While government's proposed US$696,2 million Agricultural Production Plan for the 2026-27 season appears substantial on paper, it falls short of addressing the fundamental vulnerability at the heart of Zimbabwe’s agriculture.
Over 90% of cropping remains rain-fed. Much of the allocation continues to prioritise annual input support programmes such as Pfumvudza/Intwasa, cotton production and mechanisation, rather than the large-scale irrigation expansion and climate-resilient infrastructure needed to shield food production from increasingly frequent El Niño-induced droughts.
A bumper harvest may buy the country time, but it does not eliminate the structural weaknesses that repeatedly leave millions vulnerable whenever the rains fail. As the 2023-24 drought demonstrated, emergency responses are far more costly than investing in resilience before disaster strikes.
Agriculture is not merely another sector. It remains one of the country’s largest employers, biggest forex generator and a key supplier of raw materials to manufacturing. Banking, retail, logistics and food processing all ultimately depend on rainfall.
Betting on strong economic expansion while one of the strongest downside risks in years is already confirmed appears increasingly difficult to justify.
The risks extend beyond rainfall.
Global conditions are simultaneously becoming less favourable.
That disruption is mostly around the Strait of Hormuz which the conflict pitting the United States and Israel against Iran has closed, sharply increasing fertiliser costs, with urea prices soaring while global fertiliser supplies remain constrained.
Food prices are already elevated internationally and import-dependent African economies remain especially vulnerable if yields disappoint in 2027.
In other words, Zimbabwe may confront the perfect storm: lower domestic production coinciding with more expensive imports.
Perhaps the greatest danger lies in assuming that a national grain surplus automatically means national food security.
Households in parts of Manicaland, Masvingo and Matabeleland South are expected to exhaust food stocks from around October, with some areas moving into Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity between October and January despite the national bumper harvest.
This highlights a reality Zimbabwe has repeatedly confronted: national production statistics often conceal severe regional shortages.
Government deserves credit for strengthening the Strategic Grain Reserve and putting in place contingency measures.
Those efforts are laudable.
But preparedness should not translate to complacency.
The next six months demand realism rather than optimism.
They require accelerated irrigation investment, timely distribution of drought-tolerant seed varieties, stronger early warning systems, greater support for vulnerable districts and prudent fiscal planning that acknowledges the possibility of another agricultural shock.
Hope is not an economic strategy.
