People are not happy, that is very clear

By The Standard | Jun. 21, 2021 | 6 Min read

THE Afrobarometer round eight survey on Zimbabwe released on June 17 2021 shows that since the now late former President Robert Mugabe’s ouster in a military coup in 2017, people believe that there are defects in Emmerson Mnangagwa’s ruling machinery.

BY PHILLAN ZAMCHIYA

Grievances are widespread among people of both sexes and all ages living in urban and rural areas albeit to slightly varying degrees. This social, economic and political discontent is breeding a silent social war. This is caused by the government’s incompetence leading to a weak social contract, economic hardships, food shortages, partisan institutions, and the ruling party’s growing illegitimacy.

However, this has not directly translated to an alternative electoral support for the resilient MDC Alliance, which despite State-engineered weapons of mass destruction has remained engraved in its social base and politically competitive.

The survey pits the MDC-A led by Nelson Chamisa and Zanu PF led by Mnangagwa.

I asked the scientists whether it was by design to only focus on the two political parties? The scientists said other political parties were variables but collectively could not make it beyond 1%. So those two parties were the only statistically significant as per respondents. Fair enough, as it confirms the reality of Zimbabwe’s political polarisation.

So, here are some preliminary reflections of what the survey might mean to the MDC-A and Zanu PF:

Zanu PF’s rural legitimacy is evidently waning following the loss of urban legitimacy in the 1990s. The majority of the citizenry in the rural areas (62%) feel that the country is going in the wrong direction. However, this does not directly translate to the MDC-A’s rural legitimacy. Be that as it may, this is a big opportunity to harness the growing rural discontent and articulate a vision based on the quotidian livelihoods concerns of the people and perhaps a wider vision of development of industries in rural areas (Dira).
Zanu PF’s propaganda on the economy is working most among those with no formal education. MDC-A, in general, has a strong resonance among those with post-secondary education. This is probably because the less-educated do not resonate with the MDC-A’s modernist vision based on aesthetic cities and formal jobs. Perhaps specific interventions are needed to appeal to the less-educated in marginalised villages.
Zanu PF government is losing confidence across all demographic groupings. 61% of those above 56 years believe the country is going in the wrong direction. 67% of those who are 18-35 years and 71% of those between 36 and 55 years believe the same. The confidence left for Zanu PF is largely concentrated among the older generation. The 18-35 years category should be more resolute in speaking out against the direction the country is going than the 36-55 years age group. However, they know no other way of life and have never known another Zimbabwe.
Surprisingly, Midlands province (Mnangagwa’s adopted home area) is one of the provinces with the highest number of people (80%) saying the economy is doing badly. This means Mnangagwa’s policy of governance through ethnic ties is not translating to the betterment of economic livelihoods for all. There can be a disconnect between the elite and the subalterns within the same region.
However, the government is losing rural legitimacy but the data shows the greater share of loyalty that remains is concentrated in Mashonaland provinces with less people, by comparison to other provinces, believing the economic condition is bad as follows: (1) Mashonaland Central (53%), (2) Mashonaland East (62%), (3) Mashonaland West (67%). All the other seven provinces have above 70% of people saying the economic condition is bad.

There is need for a targeted strategy to break the Mashonaland authoritarian axis of conditioned and structured politics. Given the systematic side-lining of Matabeleland in politics and development, there is a chance for pragmatic alliance building.

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Looking forward, the country is despondent and there is no hope. Only 35% think the economic situation will improve.

Social discontent and silent social war is widespread. MDC-A must strengthen the socio-economic and poverty reduction centred mobilisation and messaging. Last year, most Zimbabweans went several months without food (52%), medicine (55%), cash (87%) and clean water (51%). A majority said government was performing badly on creating jobs (91%), keeping prices stable (78%), improving living standards of the poor (75%), and other issues.
However, not all is doom for the government. Most Zimbabweans (81%) think the government managed COVID-19 pandemic well. This is because the MDC-A’s initial responses to the pandemic were not co-ordinated and were seen as desperate efforts to exploit the pandemic for political benefit.
A national response beyond partisan interests is needed in times of natural calamities. MDC-A leadership must still grow on this. Related to it is that 81% support lockdowns though the majority find it hard to comply.
On by-elections, 51% believe it is important to postpone elections due to COVID-19 pandemic. This is too close and MDC-A can turn the tide and the ride once its position is clear on whether to participate or not in the elections. There have been mixed and confusing messages from the top echelons of leadership.
Mnangagwa has a weak social contract with the citizens. Only 48% of Zimbabweans trust Mnangagwa. Considerably more Zimbabweans trust NGOs (79%). These could mainly be humanitarian NGOs that have replaced the State in the rural areas and low-income urban suburbs through provision of food, cash transfers and other basic social services. The church is also a strong source of support as 78% of citizens trust religious leaders. Perhaps, MDC-A must include churches from the national to the local level in the Citizens Convergence for Change programme.
A paltry 38% trust the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (Zec). This means most people have no trust in the electoral processes. If people do not see any significant movement, this is likely to result in massive voter apathy in the forthcoming general elections especially among regular voters. A survey is needed to establish the popular citizenry view outside hardened party structures on whether to participate or not to participate in general elections and the associated costs.
Now to the elephant in the room. Despite the waning social legitimacy for the Zanu PF government, if general elections were to be held tomorrow, one-third (33%) of respondents said they would vote for Zanu PF candidate, compared to one-fourth (26%) who said they would vote for the MDC-A candidate. This is not so much bad news for the MDC-A party because it has reduced a 2018 wider electoral gap with Zanu PF to only 7% in 2021. However, this does not augur well for Mnangagwa who has been less popular than his Zanu PF party. And perhaps, sweet political news to Chamisa, who has proven to be more popular.
That about four in 10 refused to answer or said they would not vote, or that they did not know makes this an open race. Part of this 40% (for voter turn-out can never be 100%) can swing towards Zanu PF through the margin of terror or to the MDC-A through the margin of charm or to other political parties through the margin of novelty.
Of importance here is that MDC-A still has a low loyal base in the rural hinterland. Only 19% of the voters in the rural areas will vote for the MDC-A compared to Zanu PF’s 40%. That’s a huge rural electoral difference of 21% which is likely to increase when the real politics of State-engineered terror unfolds. On the other hand, the MDC-A leads by a less margin of 14% in the urban areas as it will get 36% compared to Zanu PF’s 22%. So MDC-A must make inroads in the rural areas and consolidate the urban areas.

It is evident that the people are not happy but the beast is heavily wounded by statistics from this 8th Afrobarometer survey. A wounded Zanu PF is likely to increase the securitisation of party and State institutions, intensify efforts to infiltrate and decimate the MDC-A from the political map, target activists and ensure their lives are “short, nasty and brutal”. Meanwhile, the beast will start rigging the general 2023 election well before they are gazetted. But all this can be countered with effective strategies to harness the silent social war and widespread discontent into a peaceful political revolution at home and in the diaspora that can re-engineer society for real change and the country towards the right direction.